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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER FEDERAL
STATUTES: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE, OR MUTUAL ABDICATION?
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou com'st in such a questionable shape ....
William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act I
To ask him his intentions? What a violation of

Twentieth Century principles!
George Bernard Shaw, You Never Can Tell Act III
INTRODUCTION

Implied private rights of action are judicially inferred rights to
relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a federal statute.'
Although implied rights afford private litigants needed access to

federal courts,2 the implication doctrine has been severely restricted in
recent years and, as signified by Supreme Court decisions in the 1980

Term, 3 may be in danger of evisceration. For years, inconsistent
standards were invoked in the implication area. 4

In the 1975

landmark decision Cort v. Ash, 5 the Court attempted to provide

guidelines 6 to reconcile these standards. Three 1979 decisions, 7
however, signalled a reconsideration of the implication doctrine and
led to a renewal of the prior confusion. Chipping away at aspects of

1. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
2. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964); Note, Implication of
PrivateActions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. Corp. L. 371, 371
(1976) [hereinafter cited as From Borak to Ash].
3. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981)
(denying a federal common-law right for the abatement of a public nuisance caused
by interstate water pollution).
4. Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations:
The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 Temp. L.Q. 469, 472-77 (1981); Hazen,
Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell nor a
Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 Vand. L. Rev.
1333, 1346-58 (1980); see infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
5. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
6. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
7. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redlington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979).
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the Cort standard," the Court has introduced new emphases and
concerns that create almost irrebuttable presumptions against
implication. 9 Although the Court has not expressly rejected Cort, the
effect of recent Supreme Court decisions has been to emasculate Cort
without replacing it with adequate guidelines. Consequently, an
amorphous restrictive standard for implication has emerged. 10
Most lower federal courts have properly respected the Supreme
Court's restrictive policy toward implication." Some lower courts
have responded, however, with confused analyses' 2 that reflect a
tension among the Justices' varying approaches to the implication
doctrine. Often agreeing in the restrictive judgments, the Justices
frequently differ with respect to the appropriate standard to
be
3
applied and the weight to be afforded elements of the analysis. '
The articulated justifications for the recent restrictive rulings are
deference to congressional intent, 14 and the inappropriateness of
judicial amendment of comprehensive federal schemes' 5 involving
8. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1783-84 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
9. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1088, 1108 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp.
1370, 1374-76 (D. Del. 1981); infra pt. I(B).
10. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Swygert, J., dissenting); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120, 127 (2d Cir.
1981).
11. See, e.g., Community Psychiatric Centers v. Grant, 664 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1981); Miscellaneous Serv. Workers, Teamsters Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1981); Osborn v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 660 F.2d 740
(9th Cir. 1981); Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981);
Till v. Unifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill v. Der,
521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981); Biltz v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., No. 4-80424 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 1981); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz.
1981).
12. See infra pt. If(B).
13. Compare California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1778-79 (1981) (White,
J.) (the Cort v. Ash factors are a "preferred approach" and are "relevant inquiries"),
with id. at 1783 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[t]he Cort v. Ash analysis is ...a part of
our law"), with id. at 1783-84 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) ("the
Court's opinion places somewhat more emphasis on Cort v. Ash . . .than is war-

ranted").
14. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2622 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.Ct. 2061,
2066 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1580 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); Transamerica Mtge. Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568 (1979).
15. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2615, 2623 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.Ct.
2061, 2069 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct.
1571, 1581-82 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 783 (1981);
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complex subject matter,16 a function more properly committed to the
unique institutional competence of Congress. 7 The Court's
underlying concern is the prevention of a flood of litigation in the
federal judiciary.' Consequently, the Court is increasingly reluctant
to find an implied right in the absence of clear congressional mandate
Such mandate, however, is
to afford this right to private litigants.'
rarely present. 0
Part I of this Note describes the development of the Supreme
Court's implication standard and the erosion in recent decisions of the
Cort v. Ash analysis. Part II summarizes the current standard,
examines recent lower federal court decisions to determine whether
the Court has provided clear precedent, and explores the different
approaches taken by the courts this year. Part III then analyzes the
Court's current standard in light of its policy concerns and questions
the extent to which these concerns should affect the Court's
implication approach. Finally, this Note, while acknowledging the
legitimacy of the reluctance of the Court to overburden its resources
and overreach its competence, suggests that the Court consider certain
factors that may favor implication, and encourages the Court to
afford relief to deserving injured private parties. To the extent that the
Court continues to deny such relief, this Note urges Congress to
cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2626 (1981) (effect of comprehensive statutes on § 1983 actions); City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93 (1981) (effect of comprehensive
statutes on federal common-law actions).
16. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070
(1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 784 (1981); cf. City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (1981) (effect of complex subject matter
on statutory preemption of federal common law).
17. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1582
(1981); Greene, supra note 4, at 483, 487, 493, 499; see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070 (1981); J. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy
The Administrative Process and American Government 94 (1978).
18. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2628-29 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615,
2625 n.27 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 74041, 747 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting); From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 374-75; cf. Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 35-36 (1980) (burden on judiciary if implication under constitutional provision); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(same).
19. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2629 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id.
at 2623-25; Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2069 n. 17
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780-81 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1582 (1981).
20. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2629 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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respond to the Court's new posture with a clear and overdue
expression of its will.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLICATION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court established the doctrine of implication over
sixty-five years ago in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby. 2 1 Stating

that this doctrine is "but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi

remedium" 2 2 -where there is a right there is a remedy-the Court
a deterrent
noted that fear of liability to private suit may be as potent
23
to statutory violations as is governmental prosecution.
In its decisions between 1916 and 1975, the Court invoked several

different implication standards that yielded inconsistent results. 24 In

21. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Court held that a violation of a federal employee
protection statute resulting in injury to a railroad employee who was one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted gave rise to an implied cause of
action for damages in favor of the injured party. Id. at 39.
22. Id. at 39-40.
23. Id. at 42.
24. Greene, supra note 4, at 472-77; Hazen, supra note 4, at 1346-58; Note,
Implication Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933- The Effect of Aaron
v. SEC, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 1161, 1167 n.33 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Implication
under Section 17(a) of the SecuritiesAct of 1933]; Note, A New Directionfor Implied
Causes of Action, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 505, 505-06 & n.2, 515-16 (1980); Note,
Confusing Signalsfrom the Burger Court: JudicialRefinement of Private Causes of
Action, 16 Tulsa L.J. 91, 93-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Confusing Signals from
the Burger Court]; Casenote, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association: Implied Private Rights of Action for Damages Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 12 Envtl. L. 197, 200-03
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Implied Private Rights of Action Under the FWPCAJ.
The theory invoked by the Court in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916), implying a remedy where violation of a statutory duty results in injury "to
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," has been labelled
the tort theory, see From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 376, and was abandoned in
favor of more restrictive and specific criteria for implication. Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1392, 1394 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Some Implications for Implication]. In at least two instances an implied remedy was found available based on the
jurisdictional provision of a statute. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213
(1944). From the 1950's to the 1970's, the confusion with respect to appropriate
theories for implication was represented by the emergence of two distinct theories in
the implication area: (1) examining legislative intent to afford a judicially implied
remedy; or (2) examining whether the statutory scheme suggested that an implied
remedy would further the purpose of the act. Greene, supra note 4, at 474-78.
Compare National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (legislative intent; denying an implied private right), and
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (same), and Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Comm'n Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (same),
with Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (legislative purpose;
implying a right), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (same). The more
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the 1960's, when the Court more often applied an expansive
implication analysis, 25 an implied right of action was frequently

found.
A. CORT v. ASH: The Court Provides Guidelines
A unanimous Supreme Court attempted to synthesize its prior
standards and decisions26 into a more workable and consistent analysis
in Cort v. Ash. 7 Four factors were deemed relevant to the
implication inquiry:

(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether there is any explicit or implicit legislative intent to
create or to deny the remedy;

(3) whether implication is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme; and
(4) whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state
law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action

based solely on federal law. 8
In Cort, the Justices seemed to attach equal weight to each of the
four "relevant" factors and, finding that none of them had been

satisfied, denied the implied remedy.29 The Cort analysis represented

expansive legislative purpose approach has been criticized as encouraging judicial
legislation, see Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of the Utility of Private Litigation Under
the FederalSecurities Laws, 5 See. Reg. L.J. 3, 10-11 (1977), and has been rejected
by the Court. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). The Court
today has embraced the legislative intent approach to the exclusion of all other
theories. See infra pt. II(A) .
25. Greene, supra note 4, at 476-77; Hazen, supra note 4, at 1352-55; see, e.g.,
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
26. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
27. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). A derivative suit was brought against corporate directors
for contributions made with respect to the 1972 Presidential election. Stockholders
sought an implied private right of action under § 610 of the Federal Election Laws,
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III 1973) (repealed 1976), which prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures with respect to certain federal
elections. 422 U.S. at 68.
28. 422 U.S. at 78.
29. See id. at 78, 80-85. The availability and adequacy of the corporate respondents state remedies were justification in part for the denial of the remedy under
federal law. See id. at 84. In addressing this fourth factor, the Court stated that
corporations are traditionally "creatures of state law," id., and state law generally
governs the internal affairs of a corporation. Id. at 84-85. The Court also noted the
possibility of adequate state remedies: The respondents had initially brought an ultra
vires claim under federal pendent jurisdiction, and the Court suggested that a claim
for an alleged misuse of corporate funds may give rise to an action for breach of a
fiduciary duty under state law. Id.
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a restrictive approach to implication, 30 and the four factors implicitly
embody various considerations: The first two factors dictate deference

to congressional intent; 31 the third factor implicates a policy
determination and requires a broad assessment of legislative

purpose; 32 the fourth factor addresses federalism concerns. 33
Intended to assist judges in the difficult task of ascertaining legislative

intent, 34 this "multifactor balancing" test 35 could easily be applied to
support implication if a court emphasized the policy considerations

implicit in the more flexible third and fourth factors of the analysis.30

B. The Erosion of CoiT
The Court's methodology in implied private right of action cases
was restricted in three decisions in 1979 in which several members of

the Court adhered to a stricter standard than was set forth in Cort v.

Ash. 37 It became clear that the four factors were no longer afforded

equal weight; 38 the fundamental inquiry was legislative intent 0 as

30. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 436 (5th
Cir. 1981); Greene, supra note 4, at 478-79; Pillai, Negative Implication: The
Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1,
35-36 (1978); Implication Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, supra
note 24, at 1168; A New Directionfor Implied Causes of Action, supra note 24, at
507; see Hazen, supra note 4, at 1358-59; Implied Private Rights of Action for
Damages Under the FWPCA, supra note 24, at 204.
31. Implied PrivateRights of Action for Damages Under the FWPCA, supra note
24, at 204 & n.47; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
32. See Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34-35 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.09 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Sutherland]; Greene, supra note 4, at
473, 474-75; Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal
Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43
Fordham L. Rev. 441, 448 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Phenomenon of Implied
PrivateActions]; Note, Implying a Causeof Action Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1095 & n.17 (1981).
33. Hazen, supra note 4, at 1359-61, 1383-84; Confusing Signals From the
Burger Court, supra note 24, at 100.
34. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
35. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2629 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that "multifactor balancing tests" tend to produce negative results).
36. See The Phenomenon of Implied PrivateActions, supra note 32, at 450.
37. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (Burger, C.J.,
Rehnquist, Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698 (1979) (Stevens, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Rehnquist, JJ.); see Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)
(Burger, C.J., BlackmurL, Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, JJ.).
38. See, e.g., Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16,
23-24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575 (1979); id. at 579-80
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revealed by the first two inquiries ot the Cort test.4u Moreover, the

first two Cort factors were infused with presumptions against implication. 4 1 The Court placed less emphasis on those factors of the Cort
test that implicated policy concerns and that were, therefore, more
likely to support implication.
In the first of these decisions, Cannon v. University of Chicago4 2 a
majority of the Court found an implied private right of action for

injunctive relief under section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. 43 Adhering to the Cort analysis, 4 the Court

stated that there was no need to weigh the relative importance of the
Cort factors; each equally supported implication.45

The majority

opinion, however, refined the first inquiry of the Cort test-whether
the statute was enacted for the especial benefit of the plaintiff-by

stating that right- or duty-creating statutory language directed at a
benefited class was to be distinguished from general prohibitory language directed solely at the conduct of defendants.4 This distinction
has been frequently cited by the Court to support a finding that the
47
first Cort criterion has not been satisfied
and, thereby, to create a
48

strong presumption against implication.

(Brennan, J., concurring); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34 n.10 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting); see id. at 23; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
575-78 (1979); id. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring). But see Transamerica Mtge.
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 27-36 & n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should apply all Cort factors equally), Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 580-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same).
41. Pillai, supra note 30, at 3, 23.
42. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976), construed in 441 U.S. at 689-709.
44. See 441 U.S. at 689-709.
45. Id. at 709; accord Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.
2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. 441 U.S. at 690-93. The Court stated: "The language in these statuteswhich expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit-contrasts sharply
with statutory language customarily found in criminal statutes ... and other laws
enacted for the protection of the general public. There would be far less reason to
infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting
Tite IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a
ban on discriminatory conduct ....
Id. at 690-92 (footnotes omitted). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
47. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
48. Id. By contrast, in addressing the issue of general prohibitory language in a
criminal statute, the Court in Cort v. Ash stated: "'We need not, however, go so far as
to say that in this circumstance a bare criminal statute can never be deemed sufficiently protective of some special group so as to give rise to a private cause of action
by a member of that group." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975) (emphasis in
original).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 50

In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that earlier and
more expansive implied right of action decisions encouraged Congress
to rely on the federal judiciary to decide whether a private action

should exist. 49 The Justice stressed that it is far better for Congress to

specify when it intends private parties to have a cause of action, and
warned that "this Court . . .should be extremely reluctant to imply a
cause of action absent such specificity." 50

Justice Powell's dissent argued that the Cort analysis and judicial
implication in general disregard the doctrine of separation of powers;

they allow the Court to enlarge its jurisdiction unconstitutionally, and
require the federal judiciary to engage in policy-making, thereby

assuming the legislative function. 51 In later decisions that created

heavy presumptions against implication, the views of5 Justices
Powell
2
and Rehnquist were to carry a majority of the Court.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington5 3 was the first direct assault on

Cort's four-factor analysis. Reversing the Second Circuit,54 the Court

denied an implied private action for damages under section 17(a) of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. s s The Court limited its role to
ascertaining legislative intent. 5

Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the

49. 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). For criticisms of Justice Powell's theory, see Greene, supra note 4, at 487-88; Steinberg, Implied PrivateRights of Actions
Under Federal Law, 55 Notre Dame Law. 33, 40-41 (1979).
52. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2615, 2618 (1981) (Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1783 (1981) (Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined,
stressing that the majority opinion placed undue emphasis on the Cort analysis);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 561-62 (Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan,
Stewart, White, Blackmun and Stevens joined); Frankel, Implied Rights of Action,
67 Va. L. Rev. 553, 564 n.61 (1981).
53. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
54. 442 U.S. at 566-67, reversing592 F.2d 617 (1978). The Second Circuit found
an implied remedy for damages even though it recognized that the legislative history
is silent on the issue. 592 F.2d at 622.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), construed in 442 U.S. at 562-64. The complaint
alleged that the improper conduct of the accounting firm of Touche Ross had
prevented a brokerage firm's true financial condition from becoming known until it
was too late to attempt to minimize the adverse financial results of the corporation's
liquidation. Id. at 566.
56. 442 U.S. at 568, 578. The Court expressly rejected various implication theories invoked prior to its decision in Cort. Id.; A New Directionfor Implied Causes of
Action, supra note 24, at 515-16; see Implication Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 24, at 1167 n.33. Furthernore, the Court concluded that
it had adhered to a "stricter standard" than that applied in prior implication deci-

1982]

IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

Court,57 expressly narrowed the Cort analysis s8 and indicated that the

Cort factors were no longer to be accorded equal weight.59 The third
and fourth factors were expressly subordinated:

60

A finding that the

first two factors had not been satisfied was now sufficient to deny an
implied private right of action. 6 '

This approach imposed new bur-

dens on a plaintiff. Whereas Cort interpreted congressional silence in
light of the last two factors of its analysis, involving federalism con-

cerns and consideration of the remedial purpose of the legislative
scheme,62 Touche Ross interpreted such silence as weighing against3

implication when the statutory language does not suggest otherwise.

Contrary to its declarations in Cort and Cannon,6 the Court in

Touche Ross, implicitly applying the maxim expressio unius est exclu-

sio alterius,65 stated that the existence of a damage provision in a
statutory scheme weighs against implication because it demonstrates
that "when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it
knew how to do so and did so expressly." 66 Implicitly altering the

sions in the securities area. 442 U.S. at 578. The Court, without expressly overruling
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a cause of action for damages
under another section of the 1934 Act), noted that the Borak Court's approach to
implication-based to a great extent on the jurisdictional provision and the remedial
purpose of the 1934 Act-was abandoned in a series of subsequent cases. 442 U.S. at
576-78.
57. 442 U.S. at 562.
58. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 436 (5th
Cir. 1981); see infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
59. 442 U.S. at 575-76.
60. See id. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the remaining two Cort factors
cannot by themselves be a [sufficient] basis for implying a right of action").
61. See id. at 576-78, 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 83-85 (1975).
63. 442 U.S. at 571. The Court also stated that "implying a private right of
action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best." Id.
64. In Cannon, the Court stated that the existence of express enforcement provisions elsewhere in a "complex" legislative scheme is not a sufficient basis for denying
an implied remedy unless there is convincing evidence that Congress intended to
exclude the remedy. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979);
accord Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83 & n.14 (1975); see National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453, 458-61 (1974);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 203 (1967); J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); infra note 201 and accompanying text.
65. See 442 U.S. at 572. See generally 2A Sutherland, supra note 32, § 47.23
(discussing expressio unius rule). This maxim appears to have three distinct applications: (1) the existence of an express enforcement provision within a statute precludes
an implied remedy, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974), (2) the existence of an express remedy
elsewhere in a legislative scheme precludes an implied remedy, see Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979), and (3) the existence of remedies in other
unrelated statutes or legislative schemes precludes implied remedies. See Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 40-41 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. 442 U.S. at 572.

620

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

burden of proof that prevailed in Cort and Cannon, 7 the Court now
required a plaintiff to establish affirmative legislative intent to create
an implied remedy
in order to rebut a strong presumption against
68
implication.

The Court further restricted the availability of implied private

remedies in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. 0

Re-

spondent sought the implied remedies of injunctive relief, rescission of
a contract, restitution, and an award of damages for fraud and breach
of a fiduciary duty7 0 under sections 206 and 215 of the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.71 In a five-four decision, the Court 72 recognized only a "limited [implied] private remedy.

. .

to void an invest-

ment [adviser's] contract" and recover restitution therefrom under
section 215, 73 and denied an implied remedy for damages under the
anti-fraud provision of section 206.74 Whereas in Touche Ross the
Court denied the remedy on the basis of finding that each of the first
two Cort factors was not satisfied,7 5 here the Court denied the remedy
even though the first requirement had been met.70 Accordingly, a
negative answer to the second factor, without more, was held sufficient to deny an implied private right of action.

67. In Cort it was stated that "in situations in which it is clear that federal law
has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to
create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of
action would be controlling." 422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); accord Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
68. See 442 U.S. at 571-72; Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
644 F.2d 434, 436-37, 439 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
70. Id. at 13-14.
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, -15 (1976).
72. 444 U.S. at 11-25 (Stewart, J., majority opinion, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 25-36 (White, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
73. Id. at 24. The Court noted, however, that this provision "confers no other
private causes of action, legal or equitable." Id. (footnote omitted). The party's
restitutionary remedy included only consideration given under the contract; compensation for any diminution in value of the party's investment could not be afforded
because that would be equivalent to an indirect private damage remedy. Id. at n.14.
74. Id. at 19-24. The Court again attached significance to congressional silence
in light of the existence of provisions for enforcing compliance under § 206. The Act
provided for criminal penalties, and authorized the commission to enjoin prohibited
conduct and impose administrative sanctions. Id. at 20.
75. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
76. 444 U.S. at 17, 24; id. at 34 n.10 (White, J., dissenting); Noe v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1981). An indication that
Congress intended to benefit an especial class was once deemed significant by the
Court even though there was no affirmative evidence that Congress intended to
allow a private remedy. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694
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It has also been suggested that Transamerica introduced a new
factor to be considered in determining the existence of a private right
of action.77 It is argued that in recognizing only a "limited" remedy
of rescission and restitution while refusing to afford a damage remedy,
the majority considered the nature of the relief sought a significant
factor in determining whether the right of action should exist. 7 6

Because the Court did not rely on this distinction, but instead based its
holding on the dissimilar statutory language contained in sections 206
and 215, 7 this issue remains a source of controversy in the circuits 0
and requires the Court's resolution.
(1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). Interestingly, Justice Powell stated in
Transamericathat the Court's opinion was "compatible" with his dissent in Cannon,
441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting). Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewvis,
444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). In that opinion, however, he
expressly advocated abandoning the Cort analysis. 441 U.S. at 730-49. To the extent
that the Court in Transamerica apparently placed the greatest weight on Cort's
second factor inquiry, the Justice was suggesting that the Cort inquiry has, in effect,
been abandoned. Implied Private Rights Under the FWPCA, supra note 24, at 211.
See Greene, supra note 4, which argues that Transamericawas not an appropriate
candidate for the application of the "hard-line stance" against implication adopted
by Justices Rehnquist and Powell in Cannon, in light of the "antiquity" of the statute
involved. Id. at 485 n.92.
77. 444 U.S. at 25-26, 30-31 (White, J., dissenting).
78. Id. Justice White stressed that the Court, in confusing the separate and
distinct issue of the availability of a private right of action with the question of the
nature of the relief, had erroneously suggested that an implied private right of action
may be denied on the basis that monetary relief is sought. Id. He stated: "Once it is
recognized that a statute creates an implied right of action, courts have wide discretion in fashioning available relief." Id. at 30 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
239 (1979) (the question whether "a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically
distinct and prior to the question of what relief. . . a litigant may be entitled to
receive"); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The
existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate
remedies."); and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("where . . . a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue . . . federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done")); see infra note 175 and accompanying text.
In addition, Justice White, in addressing the third and fourth factors bypassed by the
majority, emphasized that the plaintiffs lacked redress for their injuries. 444 U.S. at
34-35. Traditionally, the regulation of investment advisers has been a matter of
federal law, id. at 35-36, and the SEC was not equipped to handle the growth of
enforcement problems under the Act. Id. at 35 & n. 12.
79. 444 U.S. at 15-16, 19-25.
80. A request for damages has been a factor militating against implication in
some lower federal court decisions. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [Current]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,399, at 92,393, 92,396, 92,397-98 (6th Cir. Dec. 23,
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 255-63 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3547 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-431); Haggiag v. Blum, No. 80 Civ. 4872, slip op.
at 8-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1981); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 514 F.
Supp. 68, 78 (C.D. Ill. 1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 299300, 301 (D. Del. 1981); Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
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Having substantially departed in these decisions from the Cort

analysis, the Court would have been expected to either reassert or
abrogate the validity of Cort in its subsequent decisions. It did neither.
C. The 1980 Term: FurtherErosion and New Concerns
The Supreme Court's decisions in the 1980 Term extended the
Court's restrictive policy toward implication."'

These decisions,

which may be viewed as implicitly questioning the viability of impli-

cation in our federal system,8 2 leave injured plaintiffs seeking access to

the federal courts on precarious ground.

In Universities Research Association v. Coutu, 83 respondent sought
damages under section 1(a) of the Davis-Bacon Act.8 4 A unanimous
Rep. (CCH) 97,857, at 90,293-94 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981). But see Lieberman v.
University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1189-95 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting); National Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654 F.2d 784, 790 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 273-75 (2d Cir.
1980) (Coffrin, J., concurring), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982)
(No. 81-431).
81. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061
(1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
82. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2628-29 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
the Supreme Court's 1980 Term alone, implied private rights were denied under
eight federal statutes. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended In
scattered sections of 12, 15, 31 & 33 U.S.C.) and Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 & 33 U.S.C.)); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981) (denying an implied right to contribution)
(Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) and Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)
(amended 1980)); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981) (Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. III 1979));
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981) (denying an implied right to contribution) (Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(2)(1976) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976));
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Davis-Bacon Act, § 1, 40
U,S.C. § 276a(a)(1976)).
83. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
84. 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976). The complaint alleged that petitioner failed to
pay prevailing wages for construction work performed by its employer under a
contract with the Atomic Energy Commission. 450 U.S. at 764. Section 1(a) of the
Davis-Bacon Act provides that every federal contract in excess of $2000 "for construction, alteration, and/or repair ... of public building; or public works of the United
States . . . shall contain a provision stating the minimum wages to be paid ...
laborers and mechanics which shall be based upon the wages that will be determined
by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing" in the community. 40 U.S.C. §
276a(a)(1976).

IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION
Court held that, under the facts presented, section 1 (a) did not confer
an implied private right of action for back wages. 5 Although the

Court examined the first three factors of the Cort test, it limited its
inquiry to legislative intent8 6 and found that the statute's language,
and purpose precluded the availability of an imlegislative history
7
plied right.
The Court, however, raised additional concerns as partial justification for its denial of the implied remedy. It was unwilling to interfere

with and "undercut" the "elaborate" and "detailed" administrative
scheme, or to "destroy" the Act's carefully achieved balance between
contractor and employee interests. 88 In addition, the Court noted,
for the first time, that the difficulty of the necessary determinations
was a factor weighing against implication.8 9 The comprehensive

character and the complexity of the subject matter contained in a
legislative scheme were to have recurring significance in the Court's

implication decisions. 90

85. 450 U.S. at 767-68. The holding was limited to the situation in which a
contract has been administratively determined not to call for Davis-Bacon work.
Although the Court stated that they were not deciding whether the Davis-Bacon Act
creates an implied private right of action to enforce a contract that contains specific
Davis-Bacon Act stipulations, it intimated that its opinion may have some impact on
this issue in the future. Id. at 769 n.19. The Court stated: "'While we recognize that
some of our reasoning arguably applies to the question whether the Act creates any
implied right of action, we have no reason to reach that broader issue here. Further,
we note that there is some question whether that issue is properly before us ....- Id.
at 769 n.19 (emphasis in original). The Court also noted the conflict in the circuit
courts with respect to this issue. Id. Compare McDaniel v. University of Chicago,
512 F.2d 583 (7th Cir.) (the Davis-Bacon Act confers an implied private right of
action in favor of an employee seeking to compel a contractor's compliance with
required prevailing wage stipulations), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 810 (1975),
judgment re-entered on remand, 548 F.2d 689 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033
(1978), with United States ex rel. Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.
1980) (no implied private right of action exists under § 1(a) of the Davis-Bacon Act in
favor of wage earners whose employers failed to pay locally prevailing wages).
86. 450 U.S. at 770. The Court stated that the statute is phrased solely as a
directive to federal agencies and does not confer rights on mechanics and laborers.
Id. at 772-73. The express enforcement provision in the Act and the corresponding
right to bring a private suit for contracts requiring prevailing wage stipulations
indicated that the absence of a comparable provision authorizing a suit for contracts
not requiring prevailing wage stipulations was deliberate. Id. 758-59 & n.4, 773.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that nothing in the legislative history indicated
Congress intended to create these remedies. Id. at 773-81.
87. Id. at 770-81.
88. Id. at 782-83. The Court also stated that judicial implication, in this instance, was "inappropriate" because it would require the Court to substitute its
judgment for that of the contracting agency. Id. at 784.
89. See id. at 784.
90. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101
S. Ct 2615, 2623 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101
S. Ct. 1571, 1581-82 (1981); infra pt. III(C).
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The comprehensiveness of a statutory scheme weighed heavily
against implication in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union 9 and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,02 in
which the Court denied private parties implied private rights to contribution. 3 Finding that the first three factors of the Cort test had
not been satisfied, 4 the Court, in Northwest Airlines, 5 denied an
employer an implied right to contribution from unions allegedly bearing partial responsibility for violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, °

91. 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981).
92. 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981).
93. Id. at 2066-67; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.
Ct. 1571, 1581-82 (1981). Contribution is the distribution of loss among tortfeasors
achieved by requiring each to pay his proportionate share. W. Prosser, The Handbook of the Law of Torts § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971). As of 1971, statutes had been
enacted in at least twenty-three states to permit contribution among tortfeasors in
varying circumstances. This represented a departure from the common-law rule that
prohibited contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id. at 305-07. The Court in both
Northwest Airlines, 101 S. Ct. at 1584, and Texas Industries, 101 S. Ct. at 2070, also
denied the parties a right to contribution under federal common law. This issue Is
separate and distinct from the ability of federal courts in diversity cases to recognize a
right to contribution under state law. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1583 n.38 (1981) (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
340 U.S. 543 (1951); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967)). Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), greatly restricted application of federal common law
under diversity jurisdiction. Federal common law under federal question jurisdiction, however, continued under Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Hazen, supra note 4, at 1375-82. The Court continued to
fashion federal common law, in the absence of an applicable act of Congress, in cases
implicating uniquely federal interests. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1582 & n.33 (1981). Furthermore, prior to its recent
decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981), the Court consistently held that state law is inappropriate for resolving interstate controversies, Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2067 (1981), because in this
area there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 & n.6 (1972). Thus, in determining
whether a question is to be governed by federal common law, the ultimate issue was
whether promoting uniformity, as a means of avoiding disparity between the states,
was required because of the nature of the subject matter of the suit. Interestingly,
this analysis is similar to the requisite determination with respect to the fourth Cort
factor-whether the action is traditionally relegated to the states. Hazen, supra note
4, at 1383-84. Accordingly, had the Court in its recent decisions inquired whether the
subject matter of the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law, it would
have been, at the same time, examining those factors which, absent a federal statute,
would be relevant to determining the scope of federal common law. Id. at 1378-84.
94. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1581
(1981). The Court noted that the statutes' language was directed at employers'
conduct, id. at 1581, and indicated that the existence of express enforcement provisions was presumptive evidence that the omission of a private remedy provision was
deliberate. Id. at 1581-82.
95. 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)-(2) (1976), construed in 101 S. Ct. at 1582.
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and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.97 In addition, a
unanimous Court found that the "comprehensive" character of both
acts presumptively evinced congressional intent not to authorize an

implied remedy.98 The Court reasoned that "amending" comprehensive schemes was not properly within the institutional competence of
the federal judiciary. 99 This function resides within the congressional
ambit. 100

97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), construed in 101 S. Ct. at 1582. Collectively
bargained wage differentials between stewards and stewardesses, negotiated and
executed in response to union demands, had been held to violate both Acts. 101 S. Ct.
at 1575. The employer was held liable to its female employees for back pay: Petitioner's monetary liability was estimated at $20,000,000. Id. at 1575 & n.7. Many lower
federal courts had held that the right to contribution under the Equal Pay Act of
1963 was not implicit in the statute and not available under federal common law. Id.
at 1576 n.9 (citing, inter alia, Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1977); EEOC v. Ferris State College, 493 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mich. 1980); and
Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). But see
Love v. Temple Univ., 366 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Pa. 1973). However, lower federal
courts have held that a federal common-law right to contribution is available to
employers found liable for back pay under Title VII. 101 S.Ct. at 1577 n. 11 (citing,
inter alia, Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and
remandedfor further consideration in light of Northwest Airlines, 101 S. Ct. 2013
(1981); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (WV.D. La. 1977);
International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); and
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973)).
98. 101 S. Ct. at 1581-82. Furthermore, the Court cited other statutes that
expressly provide for contribution among joint tortfeasors as support for the presumption that the absence of legislative intent to create those implied remedies was
deliberate. Id. at 1580 n.24. In addition, the Court declined to address the merits of
the reasoning-applied by some lower federal courts-that where express remedies
are afforded in a legislative scheme under which an implied cause of action has been
found to exist, an implied remedy of contribution should likewise be permitted. Id.
(citing Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Globus, Inc. v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971)).
99. 101 S.Ct. at 1582. In denying the parties relief under federal common law,
the Court's approach was similar to its implication analysis in that it emphasized the
comprehensive character of the legislative schemes, which included integrated procedures for enforcement. Id. at 1584. Although federal courts have the responsibility to
fashion limited federal common-law relief in the absence of an applicable act of
Congress, id., the Court stated that this responsibility is iltimately limited by the
authority of Congress. Id. at 1582-83. "[O]nce Congress addresses a subject.., the
justification for lawmaking by the federal courts is greatly diminished. Thereafter,
the task of the federal courts is to interpret and apply statutory law, not to create
common law." Id. at 1583 n.34; see infra note 130. As in its implication analysis, the
Court concluded its analysis of the availability of federal common law by stating that
this determination implicated a policy question that is more properly addressed by
Congress. Id. at 1584 & n.41. Quoting from United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507,
511-13 (1954), the Court stated, " 'the claim now asserted, though the product of a
law Congress passed, is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position. It
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Despite a suggestion in Northwest Airlines'0 1 that federal courts

enjoy greater flexibility in the area of antitrust than in other areas

governed by federal statutes, 02 a unanimous Court in Texas Indus-

tries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 10 3 denied petitioner an implied

right to contribution under the antitrust laws from participants in a

price-fixing conspiracy. 104 The Court again stressed the comprehensive nature of the enforcement scheme contained in the antitrust
laws'0 and emphasized that the important policy questions raised

were more appropriately suited to congressional resolution.100 As in
Universities Research Association, the Court also stated that judicial
resolution of such a "complex" issue was inappropriate because the

presents questions of policy on which Congress has riot spoken. The selection of that
policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that
must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who
write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.' " 101 S. Ct. at 1584 n,41.
100. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1808 (1981); cf. J.
Freedman, supra note 17, at 94 (capacity of Congress to delegate to executive
administrative agencies).
101. 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981); see supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 1584 n.42 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
103. 101 S.Ct. 2061 (1981).
104. Id. at 2066-67. Petitioner had been indicted for violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and damages had been assessed against him
under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (amended 1980). 101 S.Ct. at 2062-63.
There had been a conflict in the circuit courts with respect to these issues. Compare
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1979) (no implied right to contribution among antitrust conspirators), aff'd sub nom.
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981), and Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.
1979) (same), aff'd en banc per curiam, No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. June 30, 1981), with
Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979) (an antitrust defendant is entitled to contribution from joint tortfeasors in
limited circumstances).
105. 101 S.Ct. at 2069 & nn.18-23. In addition, the Court construed the legislative silence on the issue as deliberate. The general purpose of treble damages Is "an
intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the
liability of wrongdoers." Id. at 2066. Furthermore, the Court noted the ninety-year
existence of the antitrust laws without an amendment authorizing contribution. Id.
at 2069.
106. Id. at 2070. The Court quoted Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980), which stated that "[t]he choice we are urged to make is a matter of high
policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That
process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our
democratic system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity,
the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the
Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts." Id. at 317
(footnote omitted), quoted in 101 S. Ct. at 2070; accord United States v. Topeo
Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972).
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range of factors to be weighed required an inquiry into the "entire
spectrum of antitrust law."' 0
Although a unanimous Court in California v. Sierra Club105 held
that no private right of action could be inferred""' from section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act," 0 the Justices disagreed
with respect to the applicability and significance of the Cort analysis.
Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that the four Cort factors
remain the criteria through which congressional intent may be discerned. 1 1' Nevertheless, referring to the Cort analysis merely as a
"'preferred approach,' "112 he summarily addressed only the first two
factors of the test, and concluded that "consideration of the first two
factors [was] dispositive."" 3 Justice Stevens, concurring, advocated
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2070. The Court stated: "Ascertaining what is 'fair' in this
setting calls for inquiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the
elements of a particular case or category of cases." Id.
108. 101 S.Ct. 1775 (1981).
109. Id. at 1781.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 10 prohibits Ithe creation
of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States." Id. The Sierra Club and twro private
citizens sought to enjoin the state of California from constructing and operating
water diversion facilities, part of the California Water Project, alleging that diversions of water from northern California to southern portions of the state had degraded the quality of the water. 101 S.Ct. at 1777-78. The Court had previously
addressed this issue and found an implied private right of action under this Act in
favor of the United States government as a plaintiff. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (declaratory relief and damages for reimbursement of costs incurred in removing an abandoned vessel in a waterway under § 15 of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 15, 30 Stat. 1152
(current version at 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976))); United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482 (1960) (injunctive relief to compel removal of an obstruction in a
waterway under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425,
§ 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. III 1979))).
Interestingly, the Act encourages public participation in its enforcement. Section 16
of the Act authorizes the district courts to award one-half of any criminal fines
imposed on violators of § 13 of the Act to "persons giving information which shall
lead to conviction." 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1976); see City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1025 (1980). However, courts have consistently denied private plaintiffs the right to
bring an action under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act "'to recover... the
percentage of the fine which they might have been entitled to receive as informers [in
a qui tam action] if an offense had been prosecuted to conviction."' Id. at 1008, 1012
n.9 (quoting Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D. Conn. 1976), aJ'd
sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977)).
111. 101 S. Ct. at 1779 (citing Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 27 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241
(1979)).
112. 101 S.Ct. at 1778 (quoting Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 26 (1979) (White, J., dissenting)); see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979).
113. 101 S.Ct. at 1781. Justice White stated that the last two factors of the Cort
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adherence to the "wisely developed rules" set forth in Cort and re1 4

minded the Court that the Cort analysis is "a part of our law."

1

Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment and joined by Chief

Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell, stressed that the Cort
factors are "merely guides""H 5 and that the majority's emphasis on

Cort was unwarranted in light of more recent cases that "limited" the
four-prong test."

Moreover, he admonished that mechanical appli-

cation of all four Cort factors1 does
not lend predictability to implied
7
right of action jurisprudence.

test are "only of relevance, if the first two factors give indication of congressional
intent to create the remedy." Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 574-76 (1979)). "[T]he remaining two Cort factors cannot by themselves be a
basis for implying a [private] right of action." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 580 (Brennan, J., concurring); see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
The Court, in Californiav. Sierra Club, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that
any person "especially harmed" by an unauthorized obstruction of the waterway was
an especial beneficiary of the Act, stated that "[t]he question [was] not simply who
would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights
upon those beneficiaries." 101 S. Ct. at 1779; see Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 690-93 & n.13 (1979). The Court observed that the language of the Act
merely states a general proscription of certain activities without focusing on any
particular class of beneficiaries. 101 S. Ct. at 1779. The Court's analysis of the
statute's legislative history indicated greater willingness to afford power to the United
States government under a federal statute than remedies to private parties. The Act's
legislative history indicates that the statute was passed in response to the Court's
decision in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888) (holding that
there was no federal common law prohibiting obstructions and nuisances in navigable waterways). 101 S.Ct. at 1780; see United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem.
Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663-64 (1973); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S.
482, 485-86, 499-500 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 21 Cong. Rec. 8603, 8605, 8607
(1890). However, the Court rejected respondents' claim that this legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to afford individuals private remedies; the Court
stated that the Act merely intended to empower the federal government to respond to
obstructions in navigable waterways. 101 S. Ct. at 1780-81 & n.7. Indeed, the
legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act has been regarded as
inconclusive. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 493 (1960)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the provisions of the [Act] are complex and their legislative
history tortuous"). Interestingly, in prior, more expansive implication decisions, the
Supreme Court afforded the United States government an implied right to injunctive
relief to compel the removal of an obstruction in a waterway under § 10 of the Act,
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 196-201 (1967), and noted
that the United States government as a plaintiff has an implied private right of action
for declaratory relief and damages for reimbursement of costs incurred in removing
an abandoned vessel in a waterway under § 15 of the Act. 389 U.S. at 196-201.
114. 101 S.Ct. at 1783 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1783 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
116. Id. Justice Stevens, in a pithy note to his concurring opinion, questioned
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the Court's recent decisions and stated that only
a majority of the Court can "give an authoritative explanation of the meaning of its
judgments." Id. at 1783 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 1783-84 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The Court's current restrictive approach to the question of private
remedies in the federal courts and its de-emphasis of the Cort analysis
is exemplified by Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.National
Sea Clammers Association." 8 The Court held that no implied private
right of action for damages or equitable relief was available under
either the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amend-

ments of 19721 9 or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 (MPRSA).1 20

In reaching its decision, the Court implic-

itly de-emphasized the Cort analysis. It did not cite Cort or reiterate
its requirements until the last paragraph of the section addressing the
question of an implied right,'12 nor did it mention the first, third and
fourth factors of the Cort analysis. The Court's justification for denying respondents' relief was its prior observation that the comprehensive nature of a legislative scheme indicates congressional intent that
statutes' enforcement provisions provide the exclusive remedies for
statutory violations.12 The Court emphasized that both the FWPCA
provisions, authorizing statuand the MPRSA contain "citizen suit"
2 3
tory enforcement by private parties.1

118. 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
119. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified, as amended, in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 31 & 33 U.S.C.). The amendments prohibited discharging pollutants into the nation's waters except under permits, which are subject to specific
effluent limitations promulgated by regulations of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1789 (1981). Permits
were issued either by the EPA or by qualifying state agencies applying EPA standards. Id.
120. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified, as amended, in scattered
sections of 16 & 33 U.S.C.). The MPRSA regulates dumping of materials into the
ocean waters near the United States coastline. The Act requires, inter alia, permits
for dumping materials into the ocean water where the materials are transported from
the United States, or where the dumping "may affect the territorial sea or the
territory of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b) (1976).
121. See 101 S.Ct. at 2625.
122. Id. at 2623-25; see supra notes 88, 98, 105 and accompanying text. Section
309 of the FWPCA authorizes the EPA Administrator to obtain compliance orders
and initiate civil suits, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and to seek civil
penalties, id. § 1319(d), and criminal penalties. Id. § 1319(c). Any "interested
person" may obtain judicial review, in the United States Court of Appeals, of the
Administrator's actions as long as the person seeks review within ninety days. Id. §
1369(b). However, where review could have been obtained under this provision, any
subsequent civil or criminal proceeding is barred. Id. § 1369(b)(2). Similarly, the
MPRSA authorizes the Administrator to seek civil penalties, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a)
(1976), or criminal penalties, id. § 1415(b), and authorizes the Attorney General to
initiate suits for injunctive relief, id. § 1415(d), and to suspend or revoke permits. Id.
§ 1415(f).
123. 101 S.Ct. at 2625 n.27. The citizen suit provision of the F\VPCA, § 505, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1976), authorizes suits by private citizens against violators of the
Act, provided a citizen complies with the requirement that sixty-days notice of the
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Middlesex County demonstrates the Court's position that when a
statute contains "comprehensive" enforcement provisions, ambiguous

legislative history does not reveal the affirmative legislative intent to
create an implied remedy necessary to overcome the Court's presump-

tions against implication. 124 The legislative history,

25

which indi-

cates that the statutes were not intended to supersede other existing

remedies, 126 and the "savings clause" provisions contained in both
statutes, 12 7 were construed as meaning that the provisions authorizing

citizen suits did not revoke available remedies under state common

28
law or other federal statutes.1

Paradoxically, the Court then held that the savings clauses did not
preserve a direct cause of action under section 1983.129

Again, its

violation be given to the EPA, the state and the violator. Id. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The
MPRSA's citizen suit provision contains the same notice requirements. 33 U.S.C. §
1415(g)(2)(A) (1976). Both provisions merely provide for injunctive relief. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1) (1976) (FWPCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (1976) (MPRSA). Since the
parties failed to comply with the notice requirements contained in these provisions
and, in addition, sought compensatory relief, these provisions were to no avail. 101
S. Ct. at 2619-20.
124. See 101 S. Ct. at 2625.
125. The Court summarily addressed the legislative history of both Acts. 101 S.
Ct. at 2624-25 & nn. 26-27. For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history
of the FWPCA, see Implied Private Rights of Action for Damages Under the
FWPCA, supra note 24, at 221-28.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2624 n.26. The Senate Report on the FWPCA states: "It should
be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies
under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would
remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a
defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 81, reprintedin 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3746-47; see H.R.
Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1972). Similarly, as the Court noted, the
Senate Report on the ZVIPRSA states that the authorization of citizen suits shall not
restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential
litigant in any other statute or the common law." S. Rep. No. 451, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4234, 4250, quoted II
101 S. Ct. at 2624 n.26; see H.R. Rep. No. 361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971).
127. Section 505(e) of the FWPCA amendments provides: "Nothing in this section
shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or
to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976). Section 105(g) oF the MPRSA provides: "The
injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek an), other relief (including relief
against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5)
(1976).
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2624-25.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1979), construed in 101 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
The Court, sua sponte, addressed the question of whether respondents had a cause of
action directly under this statute which affords a remedy to any person deprived of
any rights, privileges, or immunities created by the Constitution and laws by any
person acting under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1979), as
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justification was the comprehensiveness of the legislative schemes. 30
This seeming inconsistency supports Justice Stevens' assessment of the

reasons for the Court's restrictive holdings.

31

In his dissent, Justice

construed by the Court's recent decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8
(1980) (construing § 1983 as encompassing violations of federal statutes).
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2626-27. In denying the § 1983 remedy, the Court, for the first
time, implicitly created a presumption against affording that remedy, id.; The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 298 & n.63 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as The 1980 Term]; but see 101 S. Ct. at 2636 n.31, and expressly carved out
two exceptions to its availability: (1) where the statute does not create "rights,
privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983; or (2) where the statute
provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms. 101 S. Ct. at 2626; see
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1557 (1981) (White,
J., concurring) (stating that Maine v. Thiboutot creates a rebuttable "presumption"
that a federal statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action and
citing to Justice Powell's dissent); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.l1 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that the § 1983 remedy would not be available "in
cases where the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its
terms"). The Court, in Middlesex County, held for the first time that the comprehensive nature of the FWPCA and MPRSA constituted congressional intent that the
statutes' enforcement provisions be the exclusive remedies for violations of the statutes' terms. 101 S. Ct. at 2626-27; see The 1980 Term, supra, at 294. The Court also
summarily disposed of the claims based on the federal common law of nuisance by
reiterating its recent holding in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
A unanimous Court had held in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972),
that the state of Illinois was entitled to relief from the city of Milwaukee and from
Wisconsin for abatement of a nuisance caused by interstate water pollution under
federal common law. Id. at 103-07. In City of Milwaukee, the Court held that the
previously recognized cause of action under federal common law had been subsequently preempted by the FWPCA Amendments of 1972, to the extent that a district
court could not impose more stringent effluent limitations than those contained in the
FW'PCA. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1793-94 (1981). The Court
held that the comprehensive character of an applicable federal statute suggests that it
was intended as the exclusive source of federal law. Id. at 1793 n.14. Another
justification for the denial of the remedy was the peculiar "inappropriateness" of
invoking federal common law in the area of water pollution today. The Court felt
that it lacked expertise to deal adequately with the existing "complex," "difficult"
and "technical problems." Id. at 1796 (noting the lower court's conceded failure to
fully understand this "arcane" subject matter). The Court, in Middlesex County,
broadly characterized its prior holding: It stated that "the federal common law of
nuisance" in the area of ocean water pollution had been "entirely pre-empted" by the
FWPCA. 101 S. Ct. at 2627; accord United States v. Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d
327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981). Moreover, the MPRSA preempts federal common law in
waters that are not covered by the FWPCA. 101 S. Ct. at 2627.
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2628-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(attributing the Court's holding to its concern for excessive litigation). The Court also
relied on reports and debates concerning the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air
Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976), that served as a model for the similar provision
in the FWPCA. 101 S. Ct. at 2625 n.27; see S. Rep. No. 414, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 79,
reprintedin 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745. The reports indicate that
members of Congress, concerned with burdening the judiciary, had rejected the
availability of a damage remedy under the citizen suit provision of the CAA. 101 S.
Ct. at 2625 n.27; see 116 Cong. Rec. 33,104 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart) ("It will
be the rare, rather than the ordinary person, I suspect, who, with no hope of
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Stevens made explicit what was implicit in the majority opinion. He
stated:
In recent years ... a Court that is properly concerned about the
burdens imposed on the Federal Judiciary, the quality of the work
product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation,
has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to
the injured citizen .... [R]ecently some Members of the Court
have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod to the Cort v. Ash factors .... Because legislative history
is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent
to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to
mention, that touchstone
will further restrict the availability of
2
private remedies.13

II. THE CURRENT IMPLICATION APPROACH
A. The Supreme Court
The Court's current implication approach adopts the contours of
the Cort analysis, yet substantially alters its application. Content has
been added to each of the first two Cort factors, and these factors,
once "relevant" to the implication analysis, 133 are now explicit requirements embodying specific presumptions against implication: The
plaintiff is now required to carry the heavy burden of proving affirmative congressional intent to create an implied right. 1 34 The Court's
current inquiry may be better understood as: (1) whether the statutory language is couched in broad prohibitory terms and directed at
defendants' conduct so that the plaintiff is not one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; 3 5 (2) whether there

financial gain and the very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action
under this bill."). The Court's concern with the prevention of a flood of litigation in
the federal judiciary, however, does not have as much force in the context of its
denial of the § 1983 remedy, because this remedy is limited to violations by "state
officials, rather than all violators of federal statutes." The 1980 Term, supra note
130, at 298 n.67.
132. 101 S. Ct. at 2628-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
133. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); seeA New Directionfor Implied Causes
of Action, supra note 24, at 508 & n.21 (arguing that the four factors in Cort were
merely dicta, the application of which was not required in all implication analyses).
134. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2615, 2623 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.Ct.
2061, 2066 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1581-82 (1981);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 778-81 (1981).
135. California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1580-81 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-73 (1981). But see Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623-25 (1981) (in
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exists an express statutory enforcement provision or a "comprehensive" legislative scheme so that the omission of the implied remedy is
deemed deliberate; 136 and (3) whether the legislative history is silent
or ambiguous so that there is no evidence of affirmative legislative
intent to create an implied remedy sufficient to rebut the above tvo
presumptions against implication. 37 If all three inquiries are answered in the affirmative, the implied remedy will be denied.138
Moreover, an implied remedy will be denied even if the first inquiry is
answered in the negative and the plaintiff is, therefore, found to be
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.139

examining the especial benefit criterion, addressing only the presumption that where
a statutory enforcement provision is contained in the legislative scheme, an implied
remedy is deemed deliberately omitted); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2066 (1981) (not attaching significance to whether the language
is broad or right, duty-creating).
136. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2623, 2626-27 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.
Ct. 2061, 2066 n.11, 2069 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780
n.6 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571,
1581-82, 1584 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 (1981).
It is not entirely clear within which Cort factor the express enforcement provision
presumption falls. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2623-25 (1981) (within the especial benefit and language
inquiry); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2066 n.11
(1981) (contained within a footnote at the end of the analysis); California v. Sierra
Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780 & n.6 (1981) (within the second Cort factor); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 & n.24 (1981) (between the first and
second Cort factors).
137. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780-81 (1981) (congressional
silence on the issue of an implied remedy proving dispositive to its denial); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1582 (1981) (same). The
remarks of a single legislator are not sufficient evidence of legislative intent to imply a
right. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radeliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2069 n.17
(1981). Furthermore, inconclusive or ambiguous passing reference by members of
Congress is insufficient evidence of legislative intent to imply a right. See, e.g.,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615,
2623-25 (1981); id. at 2629-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2069 n.17 (1981).
138. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1779.80 & n.6 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580-82 &
n.30 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-73 & n.24, 78384 (1981). In two cases, the Court did not pose the first current inquiry as restrictively as it did in the above cases but did restrictively apply the last two inquiries.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615,
2623-25 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2066
& n.11 (1981).
139. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34 n.10 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting); Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d
434, 437 (5th Cir. 1981); see Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 17, 24 (1979).
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In light of the Court's frequent denial of the implied right over the
past two years, 40 it is not clear what evidence of legislative intent will
be deemed sufficient to support implication. The Court's language
indicates, however, that a bifurcated approach has emerged: Whereas
only one of the first two Cort factors need be disproven to deny the
remedy, satisfaction 4 of all four Cort factors is still required in order to
obtain the remedy.1

1

B. The Lower Federal Courts
Although it is too early to fully assess the impact of the Supreme
Court's implication analysis, recent decisions of the lower federal
courts indicate that most are embracing the restrictive rulings,142 often
rejecting precedent among the circuits which embraced a more expan140. See supra pts. I(B)-(C).

141. See California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 (1981) (the last two
factors of the Cort test are "only of relevance, if the first two factors give indication
of congressional intent to create the remedy"); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 580 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the remaining two Cort factors
cannot by themselves be a basis for implying a private right of action"); accord
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770-71 n.21 (1981) (citing
Touche Ross). Consequently, not only is it unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to
uncover and prove affirmative congressional intent to create an implied remedy,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615,
2629 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but the plaintiff's
case is made more burdensome by the requisite showing that the implied remedy will
effectuate the purpose of the congressional scheme and the subject matter has not
been an area traditionally relegated to the states. But see Noe v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1981) ("factors three and
four. . . are considerably easier for a plaintiff to establish than the factors requiring
proof of affirmative legislative intent to provide the relief sought").
142. Some areas in which the issue has arisen and implication has been denied are:
securities, e.g., Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981)
(§ 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976)); Picard v. Wall
St. Discount Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,364 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,
1981) (§ 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976)); First Ala.
Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,015 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981) (§ 7(f)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78g(f)(1) (1976), and Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 222.1(a) (1981)); Hill v.
Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981) (§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976)); Colman v. D.H. Blair & Co., 521 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (§§ 6(b)(5),(6), 15A(b)(6),(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78f(b)(5),(6), 780-3(b)(6), (7) (1976)); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (supplemental opinion) (Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Walsh v. International
Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1981) (Commodity Exchange Act,
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976)); Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,857 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981) (§ 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), civil rights, e.g., Fisher v. City
of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981) (§ 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660
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sive implication analysis. 43 Nevertheless, a number of decisions raise
serious questions with respect to whether or not the Supreme Court

has provided sufficient guidance in this area.

F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1976)); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981) (§ 503
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Simon v.
St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981) (same), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1981) (No. 81-850); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sen'.
Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980) (compensatory relief under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-431); Brown v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F.
Supp. 1120 (D. Kan. 1981) (§ 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
793(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), and § 16 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. §
1612 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz.
1981) (same); Lyon v. Temple Univ., 507 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)); Jones v. Illinois Dep't. of Rehabilitation
Servs., 504 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§§ 120-131, 29 U.S.C. §§ 720-751 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), labor, e.g., Daniel v.
Peick, No. 74 C 2865 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1981) (§ 302(c)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. 111978)); Quiroga v. Lawrence
& AhIman, Inc., No. 78 C 208 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1981) (Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a (1976)), aviation, e.g., Griner v. Dugan, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 741
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1981) (federal aviation regulation 575 under the Federal Aviation
Act, 14 C.F.R. 121.575 (1981)), housing, e.g., Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d
1210 (4th Cir. 1981) (United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1437(d),
1441, 1441(a) (1976) (amended 1979)), environmental protection, e.g., Riegel Textile
Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1981) (§§ 4 and 15 of the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1263, 1274 (1976) (amended 1979)); Noe v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 102 of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)); Gunnells v.
United States, 514 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.W. Va. 1981) (§ 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), and the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1976 & Supp. 111978)), and various
other areas. E.g., McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1981) (§ 1674(a)
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976)); Miscellaneous
Serv. Workers, Teamsters Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.
1981) (§ 4(c) of the Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. § 351(e) (1976)); Roco
Worldwide, Inc. v. Constellation Navigation, 660 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981) (§§ 18
and 18(b)(3) of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 817, 817(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III
1979)); National Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1913
(1976)).
143. E.g., McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 1981); Perry v.
Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (4th Cir. 1981); Roco Worldwide, Inc. v.
Constellation Navigation, 660 F.2d 992, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120, 121 & nn. 2-3 (2d Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County,
656 F.2d 316, 319 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filcd, 50 U.S.L.W. 3404
(U.S. Nov. 17, 1981) (No. 81-850); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp.,
654 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1981); Picard v. Wall St. Discount Corp., [Current] Fed.
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1. Adherence to the Court's Current Implication Analysis
Various courts, applying aspects of the current standard to a partic-

ular statute, often reach differing conclusions. 144 For example, controversy has centered around the Commodities Exchange Act as

amended in 1974,14. section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,146 section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933147 and, in the civil

Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,364, at 92,224 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1981); Goodweather v.
Thompson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,352, at 92,187 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 1981); Daniel v. Peick, No. 74 C
2865, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1981); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1374
(D. Del. 1981); Griner v. Dugan, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH)
741, at 17,843-44
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1981); Quiroga v. Lawrence & Ahlinan, Inc., No. 78 C 208, slip
op. at 6-7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1981); Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for
Daily Income, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,254, at 91,662
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981); Colman v. D.H. Blair & Co., 521 F. Supp. 646, 650-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Brown v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F. Supp. 1120, 1123
(D. Kan. 1981); Helton v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart and Shields, Inc., No. 80 C 6506,
slip op. at 5-6 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1981); First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,015, at 91,257-58 (N.D. Ala.
May 1, 1981); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202,
209 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (supplemental opinion); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc., 514 F. Supp. 68, 77 (C.D. Ill. 1981); Walsh v. International Precious Metals
Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 869-71 (D. Utah 1981); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp.
859, 861 (D. Ariz. 1981); Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,857, at 90,293-95 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981); Savino v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
144. In construing § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976
& Supp. III 1979), for instance, courts disagree with respect to the results of the
especial benefit inquiry. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 863-67
(9th Cir. 1981) (denying an implied right; finding that the especial benefit criterion
was met); Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 949, 954 (D. Kan. 1981)
(finding an implied right; finding that the especial benefit criterion was met); Brown
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F. Supp. 1120, 1123, 1125 (D. Kan. 1981)
(denying an implied right; finding that the especial benefit test was met); Biltz v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., No. 4-80-424, slip op. at 5-7 (D. Minn. Aug. 5,
1981) (denying an implied right; finding that the especial benefit criterion was not
met); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D. Ariz. 1981) (same).
145. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976), construed in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1980) (implied right exists), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v.
Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981);
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ala.
1981) (supplemental opinion) (no implied right); Walsh v. International Precious
Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 869-71 (D. Utah 1981) (same); Christensen Hatch
Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903 (D. Minn. 1981) (implied right exists).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), construed in Spencer Cos. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,301 (D. Mass.
Sept. 21, 1981) (private right exists for injunctive relief); Berman v. Metzger, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,857 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981) (no
implied right to damages exists because recent Supreme Court decisions compel this
result).
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rights area, section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.146 The most
apparent difficulty is manifested in the courts' inconsistent conclusions
with respect to whether particular legislative history supports a finding of congressional intent. 49 The courts frequently divide with

respect to their interpretation of, and the weight to be afforded,
committee reports and remarks by members of Congress. In construing the legislative history of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,150 for example, the courts' differing views are manifested in

their widely
varying characterizations of the legislative history as:
"'silent,"15 1 "insufficient,"'152 "a slender reed [that] when combined
with other evidence [evinces] intent," 5 3 and "'replete." 1 -4 These deci147. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), construed in Goodweather v. Thompson & MeKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,352
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 1981) (no implied right); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D.
Del. 1981) (same); Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daily Income,
Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,254 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981) (implied
right exists); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

(same).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979), construed in Fisher v. City of
Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981) (no implied right); Davis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316
(8th Cir. 1981) (same), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 17,
1981) (No. 81-850); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943 (D.
Kan. 1981) (implied right exists); Brown v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F.
Supp. 1120 (D. Kan. 1981) (no implied right); Biltz v. Northwest Orient Airlines,
Inc., No. 4-80-424 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1981) (same); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.
Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1981) (same); cf. Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d
1185 (7th Cir. 1981) (no implied right for damages under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976)); Montgomery Improvement Ass'n v. United States Dep't of H.U.D., 645 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (an
implied right for injunctive relief exists under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sen'. Comm'n, 633 F.2d
232 (2d Cir. 1980) (no implied right to compensatory relief under Title VI), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3083 (1981); Strong v. Demopolis City Bd. of Educ., 515 F. Supp.
730 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (implied right to injunctive relief recognized by the Supreme
Court in Cannon extends to faculty members); Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F.
Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (implied private right exists under Title VI).
149. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1981); id. at
868 n.2 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davis v. Modine
Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 949-53 (D. Kan. 1981); Brown v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 520 F. Supp. 1120, 1123-95 (D. Kan. 1981); Biltz v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., No. 4-80-424, slip op. at 6-7 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 1981); Meyerson v.
Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 860 (D. Ariz. 1981).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
151. 'Brown v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F. Supp. 1120, 1120 (D. Kan.
1981); Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D. Ariz. 1981).
152. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1981); see Biltz v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., No. 4-80-424, slip op. at 6 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 1981)
("no express indication in the legislative history").
153. Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D. Kan. 1981).
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sions, therefore, reflect uncertainties in implication and reveal the
diaphanous nature of the Court's exclusive requirement: legislative
intent. 5
2. Resistance to the Court
Patterns of discord have emerged between the approaches of lower
federal courts and that of the Supreme Court. 5 6 Many lower courts
continue to apply the Cort and Cannon analyses. The failure of these
courts to adhere to presumptions implicit in the Supreme Court's
154. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 868 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (Fletcher, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Miscellaneous Serv. Workers, Teamsters Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661
F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that the "prevailing view is against implications . . . except where ineluctable inferences arise from the Act" (emphasis In
original)); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1981)
(stating that the "task of determining Congress' intent [is a] delphic task [and] can
best be analogized to the medieval practice of counting angels on the head of a pin");
Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating "that the
glass through which we see is by no means crystal clear but is so cloudy as to be
barely translucent"). The inadequacy of this analysis has caused one commentator to
note that it is unclear " '[w]hether there is such a thing as a discoverable legislative
intent . . . The controversy has centered principally over the relevance and competence of legislative history materials in ascertaining legislative intent as well as the
weight which should be accorded them. The Supreme Court not infrequently divides
as to what is shown by or may be implied from legislative history.' " The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions, supra note 32, at 443-44 (quoting G. Folsom,
Legislative History 7-8 (1972)).
156. A number of lower courts have recently found implied rights. Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,399 (6th Cir. Dec. 23,
1981) (injunctive relief under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976)),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982); Montgomery Improvement
Ass'n v. United States Dep't of H.U.D., 645 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (declaratory
and injunctive relief under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1976), and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 20, 40, 42 & 49 U.S.C.)); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1981)), petitionfor cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1981) (No.
81-680); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980) (Commodity Exchange Act, as
amended in 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A), (C) (1976)), cert. grantedsub nom. New York
Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
1971 (1981); Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943 (D. Kan. 1981) (§§ 503
and 504 of the Rehalilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793 (a), (b), 794 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981) (injunctive relief under § 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980));
Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981) (§§ 111, 132, 133(a) and 135 of
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§
6010, 6062, 6063(a), 6065 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Saunders v. Oppenheimer Gov't
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This dissonance is most apparent in frequent, continued application of
all four Cort factors.'-5
Certain aspects of the Court's current standard have caused especial
difficulty and dissension. Some courts are oblivious to the currently
required burden of proof that the plaintiff establish affirmative congressional intent to create an implied remedy. Instead, the), apply a
presumption, implicitly rejected by the Court, that favors implication

and which is rebuttable only by congressional intent to exclude the
remedy. 159

Sec., Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,318 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 1981) (§
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and SEC rule
lOb-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1981)); Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund
for Daily Income, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,254 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 1981) (§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976)); Strong v.
Demopolis City Bd. of Educ., 515 F. Supp. 730 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (Title LX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976), extended to
faculty members); United States v. FMC Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (1976)); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp.
294 (D. Del. 1981) (injunctive relief under § 13(e)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(e)(1) (1976), and SEC rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1
(1981)); Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)); Haynes v. Anderson &
Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981) (rule lOb-16, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-16 (1981)); Rich v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (§ 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)
(1976)); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (§ 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976)); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc.
v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903 (D. Minn. 1981) (Commodities Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. § 6b(A), (C) (1976)).
157. See, e.g., McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1981)
(Heaney, J., dissenting); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 313 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981);
Automatic Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daily Income, Inc., [Current] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,254, at 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981); United States v.
FMC Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
158. See, e.g., McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 681-83 (8th Cir. 1981);
Perry v. Housing Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1212-17 (4th Cir. 1981); Fisher
v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 863-67 (9th Cir. 1981); Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 437-39 (5th Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Cleland, 640
F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d
187, 194-99 (3d Cir. 1980); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1171-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania, 508 F. Supp. 211, 214-16
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
159. Brown v. American Home Prods. Corp., 520 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Kan.
1981); Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see Leist v.
Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 303 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub non. New York
Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
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Several courts reject or criticize the application of the expressio

1 1 Furtherunius doctrine, 1 0 while others merely fail to apply it.
more, a few courts, despite the existence of statutory language that is
not right- or duty-creating, fail to adopt the Court's presumption
against implication, 6 2 or emphasize policy considerations' 03 to support a finding that the especial benefit requirement has been met.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently seized the initiative and
imposed a heavier presumption against implication when an affirmative action law is at issue. 16 4 Despite the Supreme Court's finding of
an implied right under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, 63 the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that an implied right under an affirmative action

law would be too difficult to administer: The issue raised difficult
questions with respect to who would be sued and whether a court
compliance would be more appropriate than perorder compelling
16 6
sonal relief.
Two recent cases best demonstrate the confusion and frustration

resulting from some lower courts' attempts to apply the Supreme
Court's standard. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged a "difficult jurisprudential problem" in determining whether to follow "venerable"

and "analogous" Supreme Court precedent, "when Cortv. Ash and its

progeny compel a contrary result."' 1 7 A district court in Kansas,
apparently unable to reconcile the current restrictive standard with

federal policy towards handicapped persons, proposed an alternative
standard that is more expansive than the Supreme Court's approach.

160. McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1981) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting); see Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 313 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub
nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Automatic
Catering, Inc. v. First Multifund for Daily Income, Inc., [Current] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,254, at 91,662 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1981); United States v. FMC
Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
161. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 541-43 (5th Cir. 1981),
petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1981) (No. 81-680); Saunders
v. Oppenheimer Gov't See., Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98,318, at 91,975
(D. Or. Aug. 17, 1981); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303,
1319-21 (E.D. Va. 1981).
162. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 318 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub norn.
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 300-01 (D. Del. 1981); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v.
Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D. Minn. 1981).
163. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,399, at 92,395 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1982); Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D. Kan. 1981).
164. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1981).
165. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see supra notes 42-48
and accompanying text.
166. Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1981).
167. Roco Worldwide, Inc. v. Constellation Navigation, 660 F.2d 992, 994-95
(4th Cir. 1981).
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It suggested instituting a presumption in favor of implication when

the legislative purpose clearly is "to provide a course of conduct or
duty by someone against another." 168

3.

Unresolved Issues

Unresolved issues-which the Justices of the Supreme Court expressly left open, disagreed on, or only addressed in early implication

decisions that involved more expansive analyses-have caused recurring difficulty in the lower federal courts. The first of these issues is

the question of what findings are sufficient to support an implied
private right of action.'6 9 Despite the Supreme Court's failure to
expressly or implicitly address the necessary findings since Cannon,1 0

some courts have mechanically required the satisfaction of all four
Cort factors. 7 '

The Fifth Circuit, however, has determined that in

finding the existence of an implied private right, it is "unnecessary" to
consider factors three and four. 7 2 Given the tenor of the Supreme

Court's current analysis, it is unlikely that it would embrace this
lenient approach.

The monetary nature of the relief sought has been a factor militating against implication in some decisions.'

73

These courts have de-

nied an implied private right for damages despite Supreme Court
precedent that implied a right for injunctive relief under the same

168. Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 956 (D. Kan. 1981).
169. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
170. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implying a private
right of action based on a finding of the presence of all four Cort factors); see supra
notes 44-45, 140-41 and accompanying text.
171. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,399, at 92,394-97 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1982); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 318-22 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted
sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Davis v.
Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 948-54 (D. Kan. 1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 300-01 (D. Del. 1981); Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F.
Supp. 848, 851-53 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co.,
505 F. Supp. 903, 909-10 (D. Minn. 1981).
172. Montgomery Improvement Ass'n v. United States Dep't of H.U.D., 645 F.2d
291, 297 (5th Cir. 1981). The court did, however, briefly discuss these factors. Id.
173. Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1981);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 255-63 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-431); Haggiag v. Blum, No.
Civ. 4872, slip op. at 8-11 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van
Camp, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 68, 78 (C.D. I1. 1981); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F.
Supp. 294, 299-300, 301 (D. Del. 1981); see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,399, at 92,393, 92,396, 92,397-98 (6th Cir.
Dec. 23, 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982); Berman v.
Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. 97,857, at 90,293-94 (D.D.C.
Feb. 9, 1981).
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statutory provision. 174 This result, however, is not free from doubt:
Some judges have rejected the necessity of this distinction,1 7 while the
Third Circuit curiously reached an opposite conclusion. Imposing
common-law requirements on an implied statutory remedy, the circuit court adopted a more stringent 76test when the "extraordinary"
remedy of injunctive relief is sought.1

Also unsettled is the weight to be afforded dicta in Cannon and
Touche Ross suggesting that long-standing federal court precedent
uniformly recognizing an implied right should weigh in favor of

174. E.g., Lieberman v. University of Chicago. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981)
(denying an implied right for damages under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976), despite the Supreme Court's implying a right to
injunctive relief under that provision in Cannon). Interestingly, another court found
an implied action for injunctive relief under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1976), Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (OCH)
98,399, at 92,399-400 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3650
(U.S. Feb. 23, 1982), despite Supreme Court precedent denying the right to damage
relief under the same statutory provision. See Piper v. Chris-Craft, Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977). In Lieberman, a divided court denied a plaintiff a damage remedy under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). 660 F.2d
at 1187-88. The Cannon Court had not expressly limited its holding to situations
where a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief. In fact, the Court had stated that a
successful plaintiff may receive an award of attorney's fees. Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 685-89 (1979). In denying the damage remedy in Lieberman,
the court relied on the reasoning in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981), because it "provided
guidelines for construing implied rights and remedies in the context of funding
legislation." 660 F.2d at 1187. The Seventh Circuit apparently created a distinction
between implication analyses under federal legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce power as opposed to analysis under legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power. The Court reasoned that an implied right to damage relief under Title IX
of the Education Amendments would impose financial liability upon institutions that
had not knowingly accepted such liability as a condition of federal aid. Id. at 118788. Pennhurst, however, expressly did not reach the issue of a private remedy but
merely held that § 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976), did not create any substantive rights In tho
mentally disabled. 101 S. Ct. at 1545 n.21. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's reliance
on Pennhurst as indicating the proper mode of implication analysis was criticized by
the dissent as misplaced. 660 F.2d at 1190 (Swygert, J., dissenting); cJ. Miener v.
Missouri, No. 80-1791, slip op. at 8-9 n.4 (8th Cir. Feb. 4, 1982) ("the analysis in
Pennhurst is simply irrelevant to determining a ... cause of action [under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973]").
175. Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1189-95 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Swygert, J., dissenting); National Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654
F.2d 784, 790 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633
F.2d 232, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1980) (Coffrin, J., oncurring), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-431).
176. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980);
see United States v. FMC Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1166, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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implication. 77 Recognizing the import of such precedent in a particular circumstance, the Second Circuit in Leist v. Simplot 7 8 and the
Sixth Circuit in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. 17 9 found an implied right under the Commodity Exchange Act,
which had been amended in 1 9 7 4 .110 Each circuit relied heavily on
precedent prior to the amendment which had uniformly found an
implied right. 8 ' They held that congressional silence when amending federal statutes indicates sub silentio approval of the implied right
recognized by federal courts under the original legislation.'12 This
approach significantly alters the current burden of proof: The burden
is placed on the defendant to establish that congressional silence indicates an intent to repeal the previously recognized right.1 8 3 The
federal courts that have addressed this issue, however, have disagreed
as to whether this is a relevant factor to be considered and, in addition, what weight it should be accorded.'" 4 Although it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court will rely on this factor to the same extent as
the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Court should treat uniform judicial
recognition of an implied right under a statute prior to its amendment
as weighing in favor of implication. Consideration of this factor represents a practical and considered approach to construing congressional
silence. Moreover, this approach encourages courts to adhere to judicial precedent and thus, at the very least, promotes consistency in the
law.
177. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.19 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979).
178. 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub norn. New York Mercantile
Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
179. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
180. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A),(C) (1976), construed in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,
302-22 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist,
101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 236-37 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
181. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 302-22 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub norn.
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 230-36 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
182. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 302-22 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub nom.
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 230-36 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); see Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202, 209-10 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (supplemental opinion); Walsh
v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 869-71 (D. Utah 1981);
Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Rich v. New
York Stock Exch., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 87, 87-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Christensen Hatch
Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 910 (D. Minn. 1981).
183. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 303 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom.
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981).
184. Id. at 302-22 (great weight); id. at 323-56 (Mansfield, I., dissenting) (no

644

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
III. THE

[Vol. 50

COURT'S CONCERNS

The dissonance evident in the lower courts results from their obliga85
tion to apply the Supreme Court's sometimes uncertain precedent.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, may abandon its precedent
for perceived changes in policy.' 86 The Court's departure from Cort,
therefore, can best be understood by examining the policies underlying the new restrictiveness.
A. Burdens on the Judiciary
Underlying the Court's frequent denial of implied private rights of
action is its often expressed concern with preventing a potential surge
of lawsuits in the already clogged federal judiciary. 87 This concern is

weight); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 23036 (6th Cir. 1980) (great weight), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); id. at 237
(Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (no weight); Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202, 209-10 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
(supplemental opinion) (no weight); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp.,
510 F. Supp. 867, 869-71 (D. Utah 1981) (no weight); Rich v. New York Stock Exch.,
Inc., 509 F. Supp. 87, 87-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (great weight); Christensen Hatch
Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 910 (D. Minn. 1981) (great weight);
see also Yakin v. University of Ill., 508 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 (N.D. I11. 1981)
(although a legislative amendment was not at issue, the court gave great weight to
long-standing judicial recognition of an implied right).
185. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., R. McCloskey, Principles, Powers, and Values, in The Modern
Supreme Court 290, 308 (1972); H. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy Making (1979).
187. McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 1981) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting); Hazen, supra note 4, at 1342-43, 1380, 1384; Pillai, supra note 30, at 38;
The Phenomenonof Implied PrivateActions, supra note 32, at 447. This concern has
been expressed in prior implication cases. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 35-36
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
741, 747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Call for
Restraint, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 219, 226, 231, 238-39 (1981); cf. Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2625 n.27 (1981)
(citing concern in Congress); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1979)). But see Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (no evidence that Title VI litigation
has been so voluminous as to unduly burden the courts); cf. Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (not only is a burden unlikely in constitutional implication
cases, but a burden would not warrant closing the courthouse doors to these claims);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391 & n.4 (1971)
(burden is unlikely in constitutional implication cases); id. at 410-11 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (burden is unlikely and does not warrant closing the courthouse door to
constitutional implication claims). Some Justices have remarked on the frequency of
having been presented the implication question in recent years. E.g., Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2622 &
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particularly manifested in the presumption imposed in the "especial
class" requirement. 8 If the law afforded a cause of action to any
individual who was adversely affected by statutory violations and
who met the minimal requirements of standing,18 implication litigation would crowd the Court's docket.
The reluctance to find that the "especial benefit" criterion has been
satisfied may be a response to the expansion of the concept of standing
in the last decade. 190 Sierra Club v. Morton' 'l established that inju-

n.21 (1981) (Powell, J.); id. at 2627 & n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 148 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 562 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.).
Moreover, some Justices' greater willingness to afford an implied right to injunctive
relief than an implied right to damages is based on their suggestion that a litigant
may be less likely to bring suit if he has no expectation of monetary recovery, but is
limited to injunctive relief. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2625 n.27 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 737-38 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Other Justices suggest that
assessing damages shades into policy-making to a greater extent than does affording
injunctive relief. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-24
(1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting).
188. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Statutes couched in terms of
broadly-worded prohibitions weigh against implication. California v. Sierra Club,
101 S. Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580-81 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754,
771-73 (1981); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 14849 (1980); Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
189. McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 1981) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting). In determining whether a party has standing, the basic inquiry is
"[w]hether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
731 (1972).
190. The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions, supra note 32, at 447. The
Court's expansion of the concept of standing in recent years has been most apparent
in the area of environmental protection. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,
688-89 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972); cf. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina EnvUl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73 (1978) (standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an act limiting liability for nuclear accident when
only some of the " 'immediate' adverse effects" were found to have harmed appellees). In Middlesex County, the Court, construing § 505(g) of the F\VPCA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(g) (1976), which defined "citizen" as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected," 101 S. Ct. at 2624, relied on a Senate report
which indicated that Congress intended this phrase to allow all persons possessing
standing under the Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), to
bring suit under the citizen suit provision of the FWPCA, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1976). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 146, reprinted in
1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3776, 3823. The Court noted that -[it]his broad
category of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs .

.

. whose inju-

ries are 'non-economic' and probably noncompensable, and persons... who assert
that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations."
101 S. Ct. at 2624. In fact, certain judges are carelessly employing the term standing
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ries to noneconomic, aesthetic and purely environmental interests are

sufficient to confer standing, even though the interests may not be
unique to the litigant but are shared by the public. 0 2 Furthermore,
the Court has conferred standing even where pleadings revealed an

"attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury."193 The expansion of standing is offset by the restrictive application of the especial

benefit criterion. 0 4 The Court's concern, however, is not justified;

when addressing the issue of implied private remedies. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Serv.
Workers v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1981); Spencer Cos. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,301, at 91,894-95
(D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
191. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-19, at 85
(1978). The Sierra Club brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that various
aspects of a proposed "Disneyland" complex, to be constructed adjacent to the
Sequoia National Forest in California, violated federal laws and regulations. The
Sierra Club also sought injunctions restraining federal officials from granting approval or issuing permits for the project. Id. at 728-31. The Sierra Club relied on § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), which provides:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." Id., quoted in 405 U.S. at 732-33.
192. 405 U.S. at 734. The Court found that the kind of injury alleged could satisfy
the injury in fact requirement under § 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), stating:
"Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." Id. Plaintiffs, however,
are required to be "among the injured": They must allege individual Injury by
showing that their own use of the threatened area has been adversely affected. Id. at
735. Purely public and ideological interests in the environment are not sufficient to
confer standing. L. Tribe, supra note 191, § 3-19, at 85. Accordingly, because the
Sierra Club failed to allege that its members' use of the area would be adversely
affected by the proposed construction, 405 U.S. at 735, they did not allege the
requisite individualized interest for standing to challenge the federal action. Id. at
739. The Court added, however, that once standing is established, a party may assert
the interests of the public in support of his claims for equitable relief. Id. at 740 n. 15.
193. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). In United States v.
SCRAP, an environmental group composed of law students, Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), contended, inter alia, that a proposed
railroad rate increase permitted by the ICC would cause its members "economic,
recreational and aesthetic harm." Id. at 675-76. The Court stated that the alleged
injury was "far less direct and perceptible" than the injury alleged in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), yet conferred standing on the appellees under § 10 of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), despite its warning that "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." 412 U.S. at 688;
L. Tribe, supra note 191, § 3-19, at 86.
194. See The Phenomenon of Implied PrivateActions, supra note 32, at 447. The
fact that the Court was willing to afford the United States government an implied
right under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 for injunctive relief,
see United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat.
1151 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. III 1979))), and for damage
relief, Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967) (ch. 425, §
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implication cases are neither "traceable" to, nor "'responsible" for, the

crowded federal dockets.19 5 Moreover, if the Court indeed desires to

restrict the availability of standing, to do so in this manner is inapposite.

B. Judicial Deference and Divining Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court's evolving deference to congressional initiative
is manifested most clearly in its insistent narrowing of the Cort v. Ash

criteria: Its sole focus has become that of divining legislative intent. 19 6 The Court's current approach signifies its implicit acknowl-

edgement that the issue of the availability of private remedies in the
federal courts implicates a policy determination for which Congress is
more appropriately suited. 97 Accordingly, under the Court's approach the federal judiciary assumes a dependent and subordinate

position in formulating and fulfilling current national policy in our
federal system. 198

15, 30 Stat. 1152 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976))), yet has denied private
individuals a remedy, California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 (1981), may
also indicate that part justification for the Court's denial of private remedies to
individuals is its desire to avoid burdening the federal judiciary with implication
cases. Congress shares the Court's concern for restricting litigation in the federal
courts. See, e.g., The Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News (94 Stat.) 2325 (to be codified in scattered sections of 5, 26,
28 & 41 U.S.C.); Comment, The NEPA and Energy Legislation: The Preemption of
JudicialReview, 14 U.S.F. L. Rev. 403, 420-30 (1980).
195. Pillai, supra note 30, at 38 & n.271; see McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d
680, 686 (8th Cir. 1981) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("recognizing an implied private
cause of action [in this case] would not open the floodgates for substantially more
litigation in the federal courts").
196. See supra pt. II(A).
197. Although the courts, aware of limitations on their appropriate functions,
have various devices for avoiding encroachment on the domains of other branches of
the federal government, their restrictions are based on two distinct theories: the
constitutional limitation founded in the case or controversy requirement of article III
of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. III, or the policy of judicial restraint founded
more generally on prudential considerations. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of
Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 371, 386 (1976); see G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on
Constitutional Law 1688-94 (10th ed. 1980).
198. Greene, supra note 4, at 485; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192, 217
(1962); United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also Taylor, Attorney General Outlines Campaign to Rein in Courts, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1981, at Al, col. 1 (discussion of Atty. Gen. William French Smith's
recommendations to prevent the federal courts' encroachment on the legislature by
its engaging in "subjective judicial policy-making"); Excerpts From Attorney General'sRemarks on Plans of Justice Department, id. at 22 (same); Kaufman, Congress
v. the Court, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, § 6 (magazine), at 44 (discussion of bills
presently before Congress to withdraw the jurisdiction of the federal court in certain
matters).
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1. The Significance of Express Remedies

Repeatedly confronted with legislative history that is either silent or
ambiguous on the issue of the propriety of judicial implication, the

Court has resorted to another means of ascertaining legislative intent.
0 0 the Court
Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,'
on several occasions has concluded that the existence of express en-

forcement mechanisms in federal statutes is tantamount to
congressional intent to preclude all other remedies. 200 Application of
this rule of statutory construction had been rejected and criticized by

the Court in prior implied private right of action decisions2 0' and has

consistently provoked criticism by commentators. 20 2 The propriety 2of
03
applying the expressio unius rule in these cases is questionable

199. The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing. See 2A
Sutherland, supra note 32, §§ 47.23-,25, 57.10 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981). The
Court described this rule in Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 19 (1979), which has been quoted in subsequent decisions: "[I]t is an elemental
canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." Id. (citation
omitted); accord Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
101 S. Ct. 2615, 2623 (1981); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 149
(1980). This rule was first given weight in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974), and has been noted by
many commentators. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 4, at 1337, 1348, 1384; Implication Under Section 17(a) of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, supra note 24, at 1170 & n.48;
A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, supra note 24, at 510 & n.39;
Implying a Cause of Action Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
supra note 32, at 1099-1100 & nn.32-35; The Phenomenon of Implied PrivateRights
of Action, supra note 32, at 444-45.
200. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2623, 2626-27 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,101 S.
Ct. 2061, 2069 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780 n.6 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1581-82, 1584
(1981); Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-22 (1979); see
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979); cf. City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93 (1981) (applying variation of the expressio unius
rule to congressional preemption of federal common law).
201. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 29 n.6 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting). see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711
(1979) ("[t]he fact that other provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express
remedies has not been accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an
otherwise appropriate remedy"); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83 n.14 (1975) ("[w]e
find this excursion into extrapolation of legislative intent entirely unilluminating").
202. The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions, supra note 32, at 445; Note,
Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285,
290-91 (1963); Some Implicationsfor Implication, supra note 24, at 1416-20; Note,
Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes- The Emergence of a Conservative
Doctrine, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 429, 451-53 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine]; see 2A Sutherland, supra note 32, § 47.25.
203. The severity of this rule is revealed by the result produced when congressional authorization of explicit remedies in provisions of statutes unrelated to the one at
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because it fails to direct the Court's attention to the differences between those enforcement remedies expressly afforded and the implied
remedies sought. The enforcement provisions examined by the Court
in Middlesex County, for example, are non-compensatory; the)'
merely afford prospective, injunctive relief.20
Application of this rule inevitably results in the denial of remedies205 because it is unlikely that a plaintiff can uncover affirmative
legislative intent to rebut the rule's presumption. 0 For example,
application of the rule in Middlesex County compelled the denial of
an implied remedy,20 7 federal common-law relief 208 and a direct cause
of action under section 1983.209 Paradoxically, the Court denied that
issue is emphasized. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, attempted to expand the application of this rule. He rejected the majority's holding that a damage remedy is available under the eighth amendment, even
though a damage remedy is available under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1346(b), 1346(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412, 267180 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), because "when Congress has wished to authorize federal
courts to grant damages relief, it has known how to do so and has done so expressly,"
446 U.S. at 40, as revealed by the damage remedies provided in other statutes, e.g.,
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) (amended 1978); 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976) (amended 1979); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976);
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). 446 U.S. at 4041.
204. 101 S.Ct. at 2019-20. The citizen suit provisions of the FWPCA and the
MPRSA only provide for prospective injunctive relief and the assessment of civil
penalties, payable to the government, against the violator. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(1976) (FWPCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976) (MPRSA); see S. Rep. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprintedin 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745 ("any
[civil] penalties imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be
recovered by the complainant"); Pillai, supra note 30, at 39 (public enforcement not
a substitute for private remedies). Similarly, the limited relief afforded in express
remedies in the securities laws has also been noted. See Frankel, supra note 52, at
577; see also Implying Civil Remedies From FederalRegulatonj Statutes, supra note
202, at 290 (noting that the express remedies in the securities laws prescribe certain
procedural requirements).
205. The Phenomenon of Implied Private Rights of Actions, supra note 32, at 445;
see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615, 2623, 2626-27 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
2061, 2066 n.11, 2069 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780 n.6
(1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 158182, 1584 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 (1981);
Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-22 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979); The Emergence of a Conservative
Doctrine, supra note 202, at 451-53; Some Implicationsfor Implication, supra note
24, at 1416-20; Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, supra
note 202, at 290-91.
206. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2615, 2629 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. at 2623-25.
208. See id. at 2627.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1979), construed in 101 S.Ct. at 2626-27;
see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. The Court stated the expressio unius
rule as follows: "In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent,
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savings clauses contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA evinced
legislative intent to preserve the section 1983 remedy.210 The Court's
overzealous application of the expressio unius rule caused it to reject
the application of the212basic rule of statutory construction:2 11 the
"plain meaning rule.1
2. The Significance of Congressional Silence
The Court has repeatedly recognized that "'the legislative history of
a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will
typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question."' 2 13 Nevertheless, the Court unrelentingly requires a plaintiff to establish clear
evidence of affirmative legislative intent to create an implied remedy. 21 4 Consequently, congressional silence, which is deemed deliberate, or ambiguous legislative
history has proven dispositive to the
2 15
denial of private remedies.

The Court too readily infers that silence is the product of Congress's
"considered abstention. ' 216 Thus, the current analysis does not
evince judicial deference to legislative intent as much as it reveals the
Court's inordinate deference to congressional initiative and its con2 17
comitant abdication of an active and significant role in implication.
C. Institutional Competence

In previous decisions, Justices Rehnquist and Powell frequently
argued that the doctrine of judicial implication violated the constituwe are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies It
considered appropriate." 101 S. Ct. at 2623.
210. 101 S.Ct. at 2626-27 n.31; id. at 2631-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
211. Id. at 2631-32 & n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. See 2A Sutherland, supra note 32, § 46.01.
213. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582
(1981) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979)).
214. See supra pt. II(A).
215. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1780 (1981) ("This
silence on the remedy question serves to confirm that . . .Congress was concerned
not with private rights but with the federal government's ability to respond to
obstructions on navigable waterways." (footnote omitted)); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582 (1981) (although congressional
silence and congressional intent to provide an implied right of action are not necessarily inconsistent, "unless this congressional intent can be inferred . . . the essential
predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist"); Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 149 (1980) ("such silence is purposeful"); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) ("implying a private right of
action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best"); The
1980 Term, supra note 130, at 297 ("congressional silence is interpreted as a prohibition of private remedies").
216. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
217. Greene, supra note 4, at 485; see The 1980 Term, supra note 130, at 299.
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tional principle of separation of powers. 1 8 In its recent decisions,
however, a majority of the Court frequently has suggested that the
policy-making implicit in the resolution of the issue of private reme-

dies is more appropriately suited to, and dependent upon, the unique
institutional competence of Congress. 219 Thus, the Justices have sug-

218. Greene, supra note 4, passim; accord United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482, 510 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (majority opinion); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at
730 (Powell, J., dissenting). Similar protests have been made in the context of judicial
implication of remedies under provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28-29 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 5354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1979)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 252-55 (dissenting opinion of Powell, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J.); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-12,
422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court has more readily inferred private
remedies under provisions of the Constitution than it has under federal statutes. See
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (inferring a damage remedy under the eighth
amendment even though the allegations could also support a suit against the United
States under federal statute); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (inferring a
damage remedy under the due process clause of the fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (inferring a damage remedy
under the fourth amendment). In earlier decisions, there was apparent disagreement
among the Justices as to whether the federal judiciary had the constitutional power in
the first instance-that is, jurisdiction-to imply a cause of action under a federal
statute or a provision of the Constitution. Greene, supra note 4, passim. Compare
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 399-408 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (federal courts have constitutional power), with Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-32, 745-47 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (no constitutional power), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (same), and id. at 418, 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(same). For a discussion refuting the argument that the Court lacks this constitutional power, see Greene, supra note 4, passim. Although the jurisdictional issue was
never explicitly resolved by the Court, its recent decisions suggest that the Court has
assumed the existence of its power; the question is more often articulated in terms of
deciding in what circumstances it is "appropriate" to exercise its power to afford a
remedy. Greene, supra note 4, at 469; see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2627 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc. 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 784 (1981); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 42 (1980); Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979). "The question whether a cause of action exists
is not a question of jurisdiction, and [an implied cause of action] therefore may be
assumed without being decided." Id.; accord Fogel v. Chestnutt, [Current] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,388, at 92,348-49 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 1981).
219. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1582
(1981) ("It is . . . not within our competence as federal judges to amend these
comprehensive enforcement schemes by adding to them another private remedy
.... "); see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070
(1981) ("The policy questions presented by petitioner's claimed right.., are far
reaching.... [W]e recognize that, regardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments, this is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve."); Northwest Airlines,
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gested not only that it is inappropriate for the federal judiciary to

"'supplement" the intricate and detailed provisions of comprehensive

legislative schemes, 22 0 but that the Court is ill-equipped and lacks the
expertise necessary to deal adequately with the highly technical and
complex subject areas contained in these schemes. 22'

The Court is

Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1584 n.41 (1981) ("The equitable
considerations advanced by petitioner are properly addressed to Congress, not to the
federal courts. Congress is best able to evaluate these policy considerations .. ");
id. at 1582 ("[W]e consistently have emphasized that the federal lawmaking power is
vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government .. ");see also
Reply Brief on Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners City of New York and Beame at 5-8,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2615
(1981) (suggesting that the federal judiciary lacks institutional competence to create
federal common law); Brief on Writs of Certiorari for Petitioners Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority, Township of Middletown Sewerage Authority and Bergen
County Sewerage Authority at 25-30, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981) (same); ef. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S.
Ct. 2646, 2652 (1981) (ackowledging lack of judicial competence for determinations
in the area of military affairs). See generally J. Freedman, supra note 17, at 94
("institutional competence [is] implicit in the structural premises of the Constitution
itself [and relates to] the capacity of particular institutions of government uniquely to
perform certain tasks committed to them by the Framers").
220. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 158182 (1981) ("The comprehensive character of the remedial scheme .. .strongly evidences an intent not to authorize additional remedies. . . .It is. . .not within our
competence as federal judges to amend these comprehensive enforcement schemes by
adding to them another private remedy not authorized by Congress."); see Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2623
(1981) ("[i]n view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed
that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for
private citizens suing under MPRSA and FWPCA"); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2069 (1981) ("'presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement"' (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S.Ct.
1571, 1584 (1981))); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 783 (1981)
("implication . . .would undercut . . . the elaborate administrative scheme" In the
Davis-Bacon Act); cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626 (1981) ("remedial devices provided in a particular act
[that] are sufficiently comprehensive. . . may suffice to demonstrate congressional
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983"); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93 (1981) (Congress "has occupied the field through the
establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency. . . .The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive
program by Congress . .. strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to
attempt to improve on that program with federal common law.").
221. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070
(1981) ("complex issue" of deciding "whether a right to contribution should exist
. . . . calls for inquiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust law"); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 784 (1981) ("complex coverage determina-
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therefore reluctant to find and is likely to deny private remedies in the
face of schemes of such magnitude.
The Court's generalized and conclusory references to the comprehensiveness and complexity of these schemes, however, provide little
in the way of specific standards. 222 Thus, the Court may merely be
responding in understandable frustration to statutes that inexplicably,
beneath their detailed broad sweep, brush over the issue of private
remedies. Members of Congress have avoided determining the availability of private remedies under these federal statutes despite the
prevalence of implication cases in the federal courts.2 3 The Court,
tions" under the Davis-Bacon Act); cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784,
1796 (1981) (federal common law in the "complex" area of water pollution control in
which the "technical" problems are "difficult"). The Court noted that the district
court conceded that the "'arcane subject matter ...was sometimes over the heads of
all [involved]."' Id. Lower federal courts have voiced similar concerns. See Riegel
Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894, 902, 903 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981) (complexity in the determinations involved with respect to "hazardous substances"); Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 594 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1979)
(complexity in the area of aviation).
222. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's emphasis on the comprehensiveness of a legislative scheme. He stated: "[T]here is nothing talismanic about such
generalized references. The fact that legislators may characterize their efforts as
more 'comprehensive' than prior legislation hardly prevents them from authorizing
the continued existence of supplemental legal and equitable solutions to the broad
and serious problem addressed ....

There is nothing new about federal law in this

area being characterized by its proponents as comprehensive. Similar claims were
made in advancing the legislation [in prior years]." Id. at 1805 & n.13 (footnote
omitted) (citing S. Rep. No. 462, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1948 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2215, 2215; 94 Cong. Rec. 8195 (1948)); see Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2630 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave
other remedial avenues open."); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1803
(1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("a reviewing court is obligated to look not only to
the magnitude of the legislative action but also with some care to the evidence of
specific congressional intent"). But see The 1980 Term, supra note 130, at 296 n.56
("Court's use of 'comprehensive' includes completeness, in the sense that the Act
addressed all legitimate federal concerns, and exclusivity, in the sense that additional
remedies would upset the balance created by Congress"). Justice Blackmun, in City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, stated, "that the technical difficulty of the subject matter
.... [and] [t]he complexity of a properly presented federal question [are] hardly a
suitable basis for denying federal courts the power to adjudicate. Indeed, the expert
agency charged with administering the Act has not hesitated to invoke this common
law jurisdiction where appropriate." 101 S. Ct. at 1809 n.25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in
1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3747 ("Enforcement of pollution regulations is not a technical matter beyond the competence of the courts.... [The
FW'PCA] requirements should provide manageable and precise benchmarks for enforcement.").
223. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 741-42 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see supra pt. II(B).
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however, may be unfairly overemphasizing what Congress has ex-

pressly afforded in its legislation, while failing to cArefully scrutinize
what may be the reasons for its omissions. Congressional inaction may
be, in part, Congress's response to its traditional reliance on the

courts, and its concurrence in the propriety of the judiciary's determining whether private rights of action should be implied and what
relief should be granted. 22 4 Indeed, what one commentator has noted
in an analogous context 22 5 is relevant here:
There will of course be occasions when Congress cannot make
wise decisions because experience with the substantive areas under
consideration is too limited and the policy questions that must be
answered are still too indistinct ....
But there are many quite different cases in which Congress has
not provided standards only because it could not resolve hotly
controverted issues of policy, or has chosen not to do so ....

If

courts were to insist more forcefully than they have in the past that
Congress resolve the basic policy issues implicit in such legislation,
the consequence might sometimes be no legislation rather than
220
legislation without very much in the way of specific standards.

The Court's reasons for deferring to congressional initiative ignore
the utility of the implication doctrine. Suits by private parties may aid

in effectuating the congressional purpose: They encourage detections
of statutory violations and thereby promote effective enforcement of
federal law. 22 7 Furthermore, as initially articulated in Texas &
224. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 32 n.8 (1979)
(White, J. dissenting) (recognizing that Congress has traditionally relied on the
courts to determine these issues); see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (same).
225. J. Freedman, supra note 17, at 93-94. These statements were made In the
context of a suggestion for the reconstruction of the nondelegation doctrine, pertaining to administrative agencies. Id.
226. Id.
227. Frankel, supra note 52, at 556, 566 & n.76, 578; Implying Civil Remedies
From Federal Regulatory Statutes, supra note 202, at 291; Some Implications for
Implication, supra note 24, at 1426-31. This factor has been considered by the Court
in its earlier implication decisions. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 706-08 & nn. 41-42 (1979) (Court was persuaded to imply a remedy, in part, as
a result of HEW's advocating that the implied remedy would assist the agency In
enforcing Title IX because it lacked the necessary enforcement resources); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967) (inadequacy of the criminal
penalties under § 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act was a factor
considered by the Court in deciding the availability of an implied remedy in favor of
the United States); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (Court was
influenced by the SEC, as amicus curiae, which advocated that an implied remedy
was necessary in light of the limited resources of the.SEC in enforcing the proxy
section of the securities laws). But see The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions,
supra note 32, at 448 ("by considering the lack of enforcement of the statute as a
factor favoring implied private causes of action, courts encroach on the provinces of
the legislative and executive branches").
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Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 228 the prospect of
private suits under fed229
eral statutes may deter statutory violations.

As it stands, Congress and the Court seem to be passing back and
forth between themselves an issue that does not lend itself to a comfortable answer or solution. 2 0 Institutional competence concerns and
prudential considerations of thwarting potential burdens on the judiciary2 31 are neither sufficient nor desirable justifications for precluding the availability of implied private remedies to injured citizens
seeking redress at the federal courthouse. Despite the magnitude of
present legislative schemes, the federal courts should exercise their
unique ability to utilize hindsight in weighing and assessing the practical impacts of statutes so2 32as to provide effective enforcement and,
where appropriate, relief..

228. 241 U.S. 33 (1916); see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
229. 241 U.S. at 42; see Frankel, supra note 52, at 556.
230. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 32 n.8 (1979); see
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) ("if Congress intends
those customers to have such a federal right of action, it is well aware of how it may
effectuate that intent"); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 & n.14,
749 (1979) (Povell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated in Cannon: "[Cort] invites
Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial question whether a new
regulatory statute should be enforced through private litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its
constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide. ... [T]his
Court is [not] obliged to indulge Congress in its refusal to confront these hard
questions .... " Id. at 743 & n.14. "I believe the need... to encourage Congress to
confront its obligation to resolve crucial policy questions created by the legislation it
enacts, has become compelling." Id. at 749; see id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
("It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly adverted apprise the
lawmaking branch of the Federal Government that the ball, so to speak, may well
now be in its court.").
231. Gordon v. City of Cartersville, 522 F. Supp. 753, 756 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
("prudential limitations reflect the Court's concern with managing its caseload...
they are matters of judicial self-governance"); see supra pt. III(A) & note 197.
232. The legitimacy and institutional competence of the federal judiciary in the
implication area has been asserted by many commentators. E.g., The Emergence of
a Conservative Doctrine, supra note 202, at 451; Implying Civil Remedies From
FederalRegulatory Statutes, supra note 202, at 291; see D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 770 (2d ed. 1973);
Steinberg, supra note 51, at 51; A New Directionfor Implied Causes of Action, supra
note 24, at 512-13 & n.58; From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 374; see also E.
Dolgin & T. Guilbert, Federal Environmental Law 219-29 (1974) (justifying the
federal courts' policy-making in the area of environmental protection); Sive, Some
Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70
Colum. L. Rev. 612, 629-30 (1970) (same). In an analogous context, addressing the
issue of federal common law, Justice Blackmun remarked: "Whether a particular
interference qualifies as unreasonable, whether the injury is sufficiently substantial to
warrant injunctive relief, and what form that relief should take are questions to be
decided on the basis of particular facts and circumstances. The judgments at times
are difficult, but they do not require courts to perform functions beyond their
traditional capacities or experience." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784,
1808 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION

Implicit in the Cort analysis were traditional concerns of the Court:
preventing excessive burdens on the judiciary, acting within judicial
capacity, and inferring congressional intent. Although application of
the Cort factors might well have produced the Court's recent restrictive holdings, the overemphasis of these concerns has produced murky
analyses. It is now clear only that the Court's current restrictive
standard is no longer that invoked in Cort v. Ash. The Court must
clarify its standard so as to afford a workable approach to implication.
Furthermore, the prior and well-reasoned theoretical basis for the
implication doctrine-the deterrent effect of the prospect of liability
to private suit-should not be overlooked. Consideration of this deterrent effect is conducive to effective enforcement of federal law. In
addition, implied rights may afford the only adequate means of compensation to unjustly injured parties. These considerations should not
be subordinated to the Court's fear of crowded federal dockets. To the
extent that the Court fails to provide adequate guidelines for the
lower federal courts, however, that fear will be realized.
Moreover, even under the Court's restrictive approach, courts interpreting congressional silence should consider certain factors that may
weigh in favor of implication. Courts construing older statutes should
consider congressional silence in light of the then justifiable reliance of
Congress on federal courts to provide implied rights. Courts construing amended statutes should consider uniform judicial recognition of
an implied right prior to the statutes' amendments. Congressional
silence in this context may indicate sub silentio approval of the implied right.
It must be conceded, however, that the Court's frustration with its
role in determining the availability of implied private rights under
recently enacted or amended legislative schemes is understandable.
Congress can no longer evade the forseeable consequence of its legislation-that private litigants will seek compensatory relief for injury
resulting from another's violation of a federal statute. The judiciary's
plea to Congress has been made frequently over the past two years
and Congress must heed the warnings: Congress should, at the very
least, consider the issue of private compensatory relief and is obliged
to make its intent clear.

Donna L. Goldstein

